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Fiscal Policy, Past and Present
Recent events expose some of the difﬁculties of making timely and
rational ﬁscal policy choices. The recession that began in early 2001 has
likely been over for several quarters, but as of early 2003 the Business
Cycle Dating Committee at the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) had not yet declared its end, and economic growth has been
tepid. The ideal time for countercyclical ﬁscal measures may have passed,
but politicians remain under pressure to act.
Politics aside, the current economic climate has many unusual attri-
butes that may provide support for expansionary ﬁscal action. First, despite
several quarters of positive economic growth, the unemployment rate
remains relatively high, in part because of unusually rapid productivity
growth during the recent recession. Second, the vigorous use of monetary
policy over the last few years has left the federal funds rate at 1 percent,
its lowest point in over four decades. With this primary tool of monetary
policy so close to its lower bound of zero, there is concern that monetary
policy will be helpless should the economy relapse. Third, the recent war
in Iraq has contributed to an atmosphere of economic uncertainty. Finally,
state governments face large budget deﬁcits, which past practice suggests,
and the laws of most states require, be followed by substantial tax
increases and expenditure cuts in the coming months, possibly weakening
economic activity.
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tial ﬁscal expansion in the current environment faces an additional hurdle:
it would occur during a period of ﬁscal stress at the federal level. The fed-
eral budget surpluses of recent years have evaporated, and a major crisis
of unfunded entitlement programs lies just beyond the moderate deﬁcits
projected for the near term. This signiﬁcant ﬁscal imbalance lends an air
of recklessness to proposed expansionary policies and could make some
of these policies less effective, if they are perceived as unsustainable.
Thus the long-term ﬁscal imbalance may have implications for attempts at
short-term stabilization policy.
What, then, is to be done? This paper approaches the question by ﬁrst
describing the current circumstances in greater detail and then consider-
ing the determinants of past ﬁscal policy actions. Although this discussion
provides a reasonably good sense of how ﬁscal policy has reacted to the
economy in recent decades, a harder question is how policy in turn has
affected the economy. Indeed, given the extent to which today’s circum-
stances differ from those in the past, there is reason to be cautious about
past evidence on the economic effects of policy, at least as a guide for
future policy decisions.
The Fiscal Climate
The NBER dates the most recent recession as having begun in March
2001, and current statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
indicate that real GDP fell in each of the ﬁrst three quarters of calendar
year 2001, a period that ended just after the September 11 attacks. Growth
has been positive for six consecutive quarters since then, but growth in
the most recent quarters has been weak, and unemployment remains at or
near 6 percent. Fiscal policy has been active during this period, with Pres-
ident Bush’s 2001 tax cut followed by a smaller round of tax cuts in the
spring of 2002 and large increases in spending on defense and homeland
security. The combination of economic weakness, tax cuts, and increased
spending has sharply altered the short-term ﬁscal outlook.
The high-water mark for projected budget surpluses was January 2001,
when, in the last in a long series of upward revisions, the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) projected a surplus of $359 billion for the current
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some saw a novel ﬁscal challenge looming with the possible disappear-
ance of marketable government debt, but this “problem” now commands
less attention. With each successive revision since January 2001, the CBO
has reduced its surplus projections; as of last March a deﬁcit of $246 bil-
lion was projected for ﬁscal year 2003, and the 2011 surplus is now pro-
jected at only $231 billion.
Where did the money go? The top panel of ﬁgure 1 provides a break-
down of the change in the surplus, based on the cumulative changes in
CBO projections, into reductions in projected revenue, increases in pro-
jected expenditure, and the added debt service associated with these con-
tributions to the national debt. The lion’s share of the reduction in the
primary surplus (which excludes service on the national debt) is attribut-
able to reductions in revenue rather than increases in spending. For ﬁscal
year 2003, for example, projected revenue has fallen by $451 billion since
the January 2001 projection, whereas projected expenditure (excluding
debt service) has risen by $112 billion. But only a portion of the fall in
projected revenue is directly attributable to tax legislation. The rest is due
to changes in the economy.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 provides a different breakdown, showing
the changes in revenue and expenditure since 2001 that the CBO directly
attributes to legislation, as well as changes in the primary surplus due to
what the agency calls “economic” (that is, cyclical) and “technical” (non-
cyclical) factors. Of the $451 billion drop in projected 2003 revenue, only
$126 billion is directly attributed to legislation; the rest comes from the
economic and technical factors. The relative importance of these two
components changes over the projection period. The effect of the cyclical
factors fades over time, as one would expect, but the technical adjust-
ments remain. These adjustments, mainly on the revenue side, reﬂect the
decline in personal income tax collections since the boom years of the late
1990s, collections that were fueled by stock options, capital gains, and
other income ﬂowing mainly to persons at the very high end of the
income distribution. As a fraction of GDP, individual income tax receipts
rose sharply from around 8 percent in the early 1990s to 10.3 percent in
ﬁscal year 2000, and CBO projections at the end of the 1990s forecast that
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Figure 1. Changes in the Projected Federal Budget Surplus, 2003–11
Source: CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook, various issues.
a. Change due to ﬂuctuations in the business cycle.
b. Change in tax revenue collection and spending not due to ﬂuctuations in the business cycle or policy changes.
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period.2
Given the relatively small role that macroeconomic factors appear to
have played in the change in projections, it is unsurprising that the decline
in actual budget surpluses in recent years largely survives cyclical adjust-
ment. The federal surplus fell from 2.4 percent of GDP in ﬁscal year 2000
to –1.5 percent in ﬁscal year 2002, and nearly two-thirds of this swing
remains after cyclical adjustment.3
In any case, the current ten-year budget outlook at the federal level is
far less attractive than it was just over two years ago. Moreover, the situ-
ation is considerably more precarious than these projections suggest. The
CBO’s ten-year budget projections reﬂect existing tax law, under which a
number of tax beneﬁts, including the entire 2001 tax cut, expire during the
budget period, and the fraction of taxpayers subject to the alternative min-
imum tax (AMT) will grow steadily. The CBO projections also assume
that discretionary spending will remain constant in real terms, something
that has not happened in recent experience. If, instead, the expiring tax
provisions are extended, the AMT is adjusted so that the share of taxpay-
ers affected by it remains constant, and discretionary spending remains
constant as a share of GDP, then the projected budget balance for ﬁscal
year 2011 drops by $551 billion, to a deﬁcit larger than the surplus cur-
rently projected.4
Some have noted that, even with such adjustments, the projected
deﬁcits are smaller as a fraction of GDP than those of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and therefore should not play a major role in current policy
decisions. But an important difference from the earlier period of large
deﬁcits is that the baby-boom cohort will retire soon, greatly increasing
the urgency of meeting the largely unfunded liabilities associated with
Medicare and Social Security.
The uniﬁed federal budget surplus includes accumulations in the
Social Security and Medicare trust funds; these accumulations have
become substantial in recent years. In ﬁscal year 2002, for example, the
Social Security trust fund surplus was $159 billion, and its inclusion
effectively halved the reported deﬁcit. The growth in these trust fund sur-
pluses in recent years reﬂects the coming need to ﬁnance entitlement ben-
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ances in a “lockbox” to prevent “raids” on those balances by the rest of
government.
But excluding the trust fund surpluses from the estimated overall sur-
plus is only the small ﬁrst step toward acknowledging that the surpluses
projected beyond the end of this decade are not “real” surpluses, because
it still ignores the much larger implicit liabilities that are accumulating in
the Social Security and Medicare programs. The president’s proposed
budget for ﬁscal year 2004 contains a section titled “The Real Fiscal Dan-
ger,” which estimates the unfunded liabilities of these two programs.5 At
$21.5 trillion, that estimate swamps the publicly held national debt of
$3.6 trillion, yet even this calculation still understates the magnitude of
the problem, as I will show below.6 In the face of this enormous ﬁscal
obstacle, highlighted in his own budget presentation, the president has
offered a new round of substantial tax cuts, aimed primarily at the long
term, and an increase in Medicare beneﬁts. Clearly, there must be some
other motive than a wish to stimulate the economy or to close the long-
term ﬁscal gap. Two that have been mentioned are reform of the tax sys-
tem and control of discretionary government spending, the latter on the
theory that sustained large deﬁcits may force spending to grow more
slowly. 
One last important aspect of the current ﬁscal situation is the position
of state and local governments, which in the aggregate face budget
deﬁcits of unprecedented size. Figure 2 shows two aggregate measures of
state and local budgets, both on a national income and product accounts
(NIPA) basis, since 1978. The combined current balance of state and local
governments, which treats the ﬂows from capital goods (as measured by
depreciation) rather than investment expenditure itself as an expenditure
component, hovered in the range of –0.5 percent of potential GDP
throughout calendar year 2002—roughly twice the size, relative to poten-
tial GDP, of the deﬁcits recorded during the recessions of the early 1980s
and the early 1990s.7 A simpler cash-ﬂow measure of net lending tracks
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5. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (2003a, p. 31).
6. The trust funds also have asset balances of $2.7 trillion, which partly offset these
unfunded liabilities, but this amount is itself offset by an equal liability of the general gov-
ernment and hence is irrelevant in calculating the overall government’s net liability.
7. The NIPA measure of the current state and local balance excludes interfund transfers
that states use to meet balanced-budget requirements.
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period shown, because investment spending has exceeded depreciation. In
2002 net lending reached a deﬁcit of about 1.2 percent of potential GDP.
Like that at the federal level, the sharp recent deterioration in state and
local budget surpluses is not attributable primarily to the cyclical down-
turn. Figure 3 shows both cyclically adjusted and unadjusted state and
local budget deﬁcits since the late 1970s, both as a percentage of potential
GDP.8 Whereas the cyclical adjustment explains essentially all of the bud-
get deﬁcits recorded during the 1990–91 recession—and more than
explains the deﬁcits of the 1980s—it accounts for very little of the recent
deﬁcits. Indeed, even with the cyclical adjustment, the aggregate state and
local budget surplus exhibits a very sharp downward trend in the past few
years. From its peak in 1998:4 to 2002:3 (the most recent quarter for
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Figure 2. Alternative Measures of Aggregate State and Local Budget Surplus,
1978–2002
Sources: BEA, National Income and Product Accounts, and CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook, various issues.
–1.2
–0.9
–0.6
–0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999
Current surplus
Net lending
Percent of potential GDP
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 81which adjusted data are available), the full-employment state and local
surplus fell by 0.9 percent of potential GDP. 
Figure 4 shows separately the revenue and the expenditure of state and
local governments since 1978, demonstrating that the recent deﬁcits are
associated with sharp expenditure growth since the late 1990s together
with a leveling off of revenues. Some have seen this pattern as implicating
uncontrolled spending as the root cause of the crisis. But trends in some
important components of revenue and spending suggest a more compli-
cated story. Figure 4 also shows personal tax and nontax receipts of state
and local governments, as well as their transfer payments to persons. The
series for personal tax and nontax receipts shows more clearly than does
the aggregate revenue series that a decline in personal income tax revenue
(which dominates personal receipts) is an important factor that the state
and local ﬁscal picture shares in common with the recent federal experi-
ence. As a fraction of potential GDP, this component of revenue had been
rising steadily for decades, and that growth accelerated in the late 1990s.
Then, around the end of 2000, the growth ended, and the ratio of this com-
ponent to GDP began falling more sharply than simple cyclical adjust-
ment can explain. As at the federal level, the drop in tax payments on
82 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
Figure 3. Aggregate State and Local Current Budget Surplus, 1978–2002
Source: Knight, Kusko, and Rubin (2003).
–0.4
–0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999
Actual
At full employment
Percent of potential GDP
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 82options and capital gains was considerable. In some states the drop was
particularly severe. California, for example, estimates that, at their peak
in ﬁscal year 2000–01, taxes on capital gains and options amounted to
$17.6 billion, or just under 25 percent of all general fund revenue in the
state, and that declines in this revenue source alone reduced state revenue
by $12.0 billion between that ﬁscal year and the current one.9
An increase in spending has indeed accompanied this decline in rev-
enue, but an important part of this spending increase has been in transfer
payments, fueled by autonomous growth in health care costs, rather than
discretionary spending. Figure 4 also shows the rapid recent growth in
these transfer payments, most of which are for a single program, Medic-
aid. In 2001 Medicaid payments (which are partly offset by federal
grants) accounted for 18 percent of all current spending by state and local
governments.
Whatever the cause of the reemergence of state and local deﬁcits, these
governments have much less capacity than the federal government to
Alan J. Auerbach 83
9. California, State of (2003).
Figure 4. Aggregate State and Local Revenue and Spending, 1978–2002
Sources: BEA, National Income and Product Accounts, and CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook, various issues.
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ments, forcing a broad consideration of major tax increases as well as
spending cuts, and these policy changes inﬂuence the desirability of ﬁscal
action at the federal level. 
In summary, there is room for disagreement about the current need for
expansionary ﬁscal action at the federal level and about the form that such
action should take. Recent economic growth has been weak, monetary
policy may be reaching its limit as normally perceived, and state and local
governments face a ﬁscal crisis of unusual magnitude. All these consider-
ations argue for further ﬁscal stimulus. On the other hand, the economy
appears to be out of recession, and the federal government faces a loom-
ing ﬁscal collapse in its entitlement programs, which further expansion of
deﬁcits could worsen. Clearly, in judging whether more stimulus is called
for, it would be useful to know how well attempts at ﬁscal stimulus have
succeeded in the past. Before turning to that question, it is helpful to con-
sider ﬁrst how government has responded in the past to weakness in the
economy.
Past as Prologue
Studying the past behavior of governments in making fiscal policy
can help clarify the extent to which policy actions at least had the poten-
tial to provide countercyclical stimulus, based on their magnitude and
timing. It also provides a guide to the current political environment, by
helping identify policy actions that would be consistent with past behav-
ior in similar economic circumstances. For example, to what extent are
President Bush’s recent proposals in line with past fiscal policy actions?
What changes in state and local tax and expenditure policies should we
anticipate?
Despite all its problems as an aggregate measure that does not account
for compositional effects, the quarterly full-employment budget surplus
constructed by the CBO is a reasonable place to start in considering the
timing of past ﬁscal policy.10 The series spans a period of almost ﬁfty
84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
10. These quarterly series obtained from the CBO are unpublished versions of the
annual series that the agency regularly publishes. I am grateful to John McMurray of the
CBO for supplying the data.
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timing of ﬁscal policy around recessions, given that the typical postwar
recession has lasted less than one year.
Table 1 reports regressions relating the change in the CBO full-
employment budget surplus to its own value in the preceding quarter and
to the gap between full-employment and actual GDP in the preceding
quarter, with both measures divided by full-employment GDP.11 The ﬁrst
column reports results for the full sample period from 1955:2 through
2002:4. The coefﬁcients on both the output gap and the lagged surplus are
negative and signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on the output gap indicates that,
at this frequency and based on this measure of activity, ﬁscal policy
changes have been countercyclical. The coefﬁcient on the lagged surplus
suggests that ﬁscal policy has also responded independently to the size of
the budget surplus. This is not a new ﬁnding. Henning Bohn, for example,
found that increases in the national debt tended to lead to increases in
budget surpluses in subsequent years.12 In terms of ﬁrst differences, this
implies that an increase in the deﬁcit in the recent past should cause a
tightening of ﬁscal policy. 
The next three columns of table 1 present estimates of the same regres-
sion equation over three shorter sample periods. Estimated for the period
from 1984:3 to the present, the equation shows roughly twice the respon-
siveness of the full-employment surplus to both the lagged surplus and the
output gap, indicating a more active ﬁscal policy in the past two decades.
Indeed, this responsiveness is even more evident if the recent sample
period is broken down into two roughly equal subperiods, with the divid-
ing line being 1993, the ﬁrst year of the Clinton administration. During
the ﬁnal period, covering the Clinton years and the current Bush adminis-
tration through 2002, the inﬂuence of the budget surplus and, especially,
the output gap has been high. The coefﬁcient on the output gap predicts
that the full-employment surplus falls by nearly half of the previous quar-
ter’s output gap.13
What might have caused this growing sensitivity? One set of explana-
tions relates to changes in the political climate. One might expect the
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and the budget; a divided government, with the congressional majority
being of a different party than the president, could be more susceptible to
gridlock and thus to a muted ﬁscal response. The last column of table 1
therefore considers the effects of presidential party and divided govern-
ment (deﬁned as the state in which at least one house of Congress is not
controlled by the president’s party);14 the speciﬁcation reported here
86 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
14. The second quarter of the current Bush administration is counted as not having a
split government because the Democrats regained control of the Senate after the quarter’s
halfway point.
Table 1. Regressions Explaining Changes in the Full-Employment 
Federal Budget Surplusa
Sample period
Independent 1955:2– 1984:3– 1984:3– 1993:2– 1955:2–
variable 2002:4 2002:4 1993:1 2002:4 2002:4
Constant –0.105 –0.200 –0.811 –0.349 –0.112
(0.052) (0.094) (0.368) (0.104) (0.089)
Lagged output gapb –0.070 –0.171 –0.149 –0.404 –0.098
(0.020) (0.053) (0.067) (0.086) (0.051)
Lagged surplusc –0.078 –0.125 –0.263 –0.332 –0.024
(0.026) (0.041) (0.111) (0.069) (0.030)
Split government dummyd –0.361
(0.287)
Lagged output gap × –0.304
split government (0.170)
Lagged surplus × –0.462
split government (0.224)
Republican president  0.317
dummye (0.288)
Lagged output gap × 0.304
Republican president (0.172)
Lagged surplus × 0.390
Republican president (0.224)
Summary statistics
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.112 0.118 0.367 0.078
No. of observations 191 74 35 39 191
Source: Author’s regressions using CBO data.
a. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the full-employment federal budget surplus as a percentage of full-
employment GDP. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. Difference between GDP at full employment and actual GDP in the previous quarter, as a percentage of full-employment
GDP in that quarter.
c. Federal budget surplus in the previous quarter, as a percentage of full-employment GDP.
d. Equals 1 when at least one house of Congress is not controlled by the president’s party.
e. Equals 1 when the president is a Republican.
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and when the government was divided, as well as variables interacting
these dummies with the lagged output gap and the lagged surplus.
Unfortunately, the results add little information beyond that in the pre-
vious columns. The coefﬁcients on the two sets of added variables are
large, nearly equal in absolute value, and of opposite sign. They imply
that the basic equation roughly holds when the government is split and the
president is a Republican, or when the government is not split and the
president is a Democrat. Together these conditions characterize 165 of the
191 quarterly observations—all except the last six years of the Clinton
administration and the ﬁrst two quarters of the current Bush administra-
tion’s ﬁrst two years. Hence what the equation is saying is that policy dur-
ing the Clinton administration was much more active than for the sample
as a whole, which was already evident from a comparison of the ﬁrst and
fourth columns.
To put the large implied coefficients in the fourth column of table 1 in
context, consider the implied effect of an increase of 1 percentage point
in the unemployment rate. Based on the recent Okun’s Law relationship,
this would imply a roughly 2 percent drop in output relative to its full-
employment level. The coefficient of –0.404 on the output gap implies a
corresponding rise in the full-employment deficit of 0.81 percent of
potential GDP in the next quarter—or over $85 billion on an annual basis
at the current level of GDP. This seems a large response in just one quar-
ter and leads one to think about what changes in the full-employment
surplus represent.
One concern about equating changes in the full-employment surplus
with discretionary ﬁscal policy is that the full-employment surplus can
change for any of several reasons, some of which should not be inter-
preted either as a change in discretionary policy or, for that matter, as a
change in an automatic ﬁscal stabilizer that might have a similar impact
on the economy. A salient illustration is the sharp drop in individual
income tax revenue in recent years, already discussed, much of which
reﬂects a change in the composition of aggregate income (“Technical
changes” in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1). Although it shows up as a drop
in the full-employment surplus, this is clearly not the direct result of a
policy change, nor is it evident why it should be viewed as an expansion-
ary event.
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policy response to current economic conditions is that the surplus may
change as a result of policy decisions made several periods before. An
example is the phased-in tax cut enacted in 2001. Further, the underlying
cyclical responsiveness of the budget might change unpredictably over
time, leading to the possibility of over- or undercorrection in construction
of the adjusted series, and hence a spurious statistical relationship to the
output gap. For example, should one view the decline in incomes and tax
payments at the top of the income distribution in recent years as unrelated
to the economic cycle? For these reasons, it is useful to rely on an alterna-
tive measure based on explicit policy changes.
To construct this measure, I rely on the successive budget forecast
updates provided by the CBO, the recent versions of which were used in
constructing figure 1. The CBO typically publishes two major revisions
of its budget projections during each year, incorporating updated eco-
nomic forecasts: the first in late January or early February, and the
second during the summer. By accumulating changes attributed to leg-
islative action between each of these forecasts (including additional,
intermediate revisions, such as the one recently issued in conjunction
with the release of the president’s budget), one may derive a continuous,
roughly semiannual series of forecast changes in revenue and expendi-
ture due to policy, beginning with changes between the winter and sum-
mer of 1984. Before 1984 there was a transition period during which
observations were produced at different intervals. I will discuss this
period below, but I begin by analyzing the period of continuous observa-
tion from 1984 to 2003. 
For each observation I measure the policy change with respect to rev-
enue, expenditure net of debt service, and their difference—the change in
the primary surplus. Because each update includes legislative changes for
the current ﬁscal year and several subsequent years, it is not clear how
these projected changes should be combined. This highlights the problem
of treating annual changes in revenue or spending as measures of policy
changes adopted in that year.
Much of the literature focuses on changes within the current ﬁscal
year, perhaps distinguishing expected changes from unexpected ones. But
how should one deal with changes adopted in the current ﬁscal year that
affect the future? Presumably, a permanent change would have a different
effect than a temporary one, and therefore the information about future
88 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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put this question aside and consider only the changes in the surplus
adopted for the current ﬁscal year.15 To facilitate comparison with the
results in table 1, I relate these ﬁscal policy changes to lagged values of
the full-employment output gap from the preceding quarter, and to the
previous ﬁscal year’s surplus.16 The ﬁrst column of table 2 presents the
results of this regression. Over the full sample period, both the output gap
and the budget surplus exhibit a signiﬁcant, negative impact on surplus-
enhancing policy actions. The effects are somewhat smaller than for the
same period in table 1, but of the same order of magnitude.
As mentioned, however, changes in revenue and spending adopted
today for future years should not be ignored if these changes have any
credibility. Although a policy change adopted for the future could cer-
tainly be reversed or amended before it takes effect, it would be extreme
to assume that such changes are irrelevant as indicators of future policy or
as determinants of individual behavior. Thus it is worth considering how
changes for future ﬁscal years are affected by current conditions.
But how should present-year and future-year policy shifts adopted in
the current period be aggregated? A simple approach is to let the data
indicate the appropriate aggregation. I form the discounted sum of policy
changes to the primary surplus adopted during the interval for the current
and subsequent four ﬁscal years (relative to each year’s corresponding
measure of potential GDP), with the ﬁve weights normalized to sum to 1,
and I vary the discount factor to determine the appropriate speciﬁcation.17
Based on a simple goodness-of-ﬁt measure (the regression’s adjusted R2),
I choose a discount factor of 0.5, meaning that each succeeding ﬁscal
year’s policy change is accorded half the weight of the previous one. The
Alan J. Auerbach 89
15. Because policy revisions between winter and summer start to take effect midway
through the current ﬁscal year, I include half of the current year’s change and half of the
change for the next ﬁscal year for these observations.
16. I use the annual surplus measure rather than the quarterly NIPA surplus used in
table 1, to maintain consistency with the surplus, revenue, and expenditure policy measures
here, which are based on the actual federal budget.
17. Projections for a ten-year budget period have been provided in recent years, but not
for a long enough period for statistical analysis to be practical. As in the simpler case, I
reduce the weight on the current ﬁscal year by one-half, and increase weights on subsequent
years correspondingly, for winter-to-summer revisions. That is, if β is the discount factor,
the weights applied to revisions between summer and winter are x, xβ, … , xβ4, and the
weights applied to revisions between winter and summer are 0.5y, 0.5(y + yβ), … , 0.5(yβ3 +
yβ4), where x and y are determined so that the weights for the ﬁve ﬁscal years sum to 1.
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1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 90second column of table 2 presents estimates corresponding to this decay
rate, which is used for all subsequent speciﬁcations. 
Once one takes into account that policy changes affect future years as
well as current ones, it becomes obvious that current ﬁscal conditions
should not be the only ones considered relevant for policy decisions. As
discussed above, the looming federal ﬁscal crisis should affect both cur-
rent policy decisions and the economy’s reactions to those decisions. A
summary measure of future ﬁscal conditions, such as the unfunded
implicit entitlement liabilities mentioned above, might be appropriately
included in the regression equation, but there is no single, commonly used
measure of these liabilities comparable to the ofﬁcial annual budget bal-
ance. As a modest ﬁrst step, one can consider the surpluses projected over
the budget period, rather than simply the most recent budget surplus, as a
determinant of policy changes. To be consistent with the aggregate policy
measure just developed, I aggregate the projected surplus for the current
and next four ﬁscal years, as of the beginning of the period of observation,
using the same discount factor used in constructing the policy measure.
The third column of table 2 shows the result of adding this surplus projec-
tion to the regression. Both surplus coefﬁcients are negative, but
collinearity between the variables leads to an increase in the standard
errors. Given that the projected surplus has a much stronger effect, I
exclude the lagged surplus from the regression in the fourth and subse-
quent columns.
As indicated earlier, some data are available on CBO forecast revi-
sions before August 1984, but not at regular intervals. Using a combina-
tion of published and unpublished data, it is possible to construct annual
observations of policy changes for the periods February 1983 to Febru-
ary 1984, and for February 1982 to February 1983, plus one semiannual
observation for August 1981 to February 1982. Although it is two years
removed from the original sample, this additional semiannual observa-
tion is a very significant one: it covers the passage of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act and the initial spending changes effected by the Rea-
gan administration. 
Inclusion of this observation leads to a strengthening of the effects of
the model, as a comparison of the fourth and ﬁfth columns of table 2
shows.
18 The sixth column shows the effect of including a dummy variable
Alan J. Auerbach 91
18. Although it is not obvious how to include the two annual observations for 1983 and
1984, one approach—dividing each change by 2 (to reﬂect the period being twice as long)
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 91for this observation, in order to measure its residual from the model esti-
mated using the rest of the sample. The coefﬁcient on the dummy variable
indicates that the “Reagan Revolution” produced a surplus policy residual
of –0.5 percent of GDP—the expected sign, although of a smaller magni-
tude than one might have expected. But the last two columns of table 2,
which break the policy response down into revenue and expenditure
excluding debt service, show that this overall surplus residual is the con-
sequence of enormous and largely offsetting residuals in the revenue and
spending equations. Reagan cut taxes a lot, but he also cut spending a lot.
These equations indicate that both taxes and spending play a role in the
response of the current ﬁscal surplus to the lagged surplus and the lagged
output gap, with spending playing a more important role over the whole
sample period.
The magnitude of these initial-period residuals is evident in ﬁgure 5,
which plots them along with all the within-sample residuals. For the sur-
plus as a whole, the initial observation’s residual of –0.5 percent of GDP
is large in absolute value, but there are others of about the same magni-
tude during the period. But for spending and, especially, revenue, the
magnitudes are much greater than for any other observation in the sample,
even though one can see evidence of other major policy changes over the
sample period. Signiﬁcant residuals are associated, for example, with the
Clinton tax increase of 1993, the Bush tax cut of 2001, the 1990 budget
summit of the ﬁrst Bush administration (which raised taxes and cut spend-
ing), and the large spending cuts adopted in 1985–86 and 1987–88, when
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was in force. Given how atypical the
ﬁrst observation is, I omit it from further consideration. There is clearly
more to what happened in 1981 than the simple model used here can
explain.
Table 3 considers ﬁscal policy behavior in more detail, for different
components of policy and different sample periods. The ﬁrst column
repeats the baseline model for the surplus from table 2, and the second
and third columns present the same model for two subperiods, with the
break at the beginning of the Clinton administration. In contrast to the
behavior of changes in the full-employment surplus considered in table 1,
there is no obvious increase in responsiveness since 1993. In fact, the
92 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
and using the beginning-of-period values of the explanatory variables—leads to estimates
closer to the results in the table’s fourth column.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 92coefﬁcients are slightly larger for the earlier sample period, although not
signiﬁcantly so. Note, too, that the standard errors are much larger, and
the adjusted R2 is much lower, for the earlier sample period. As can be
seen in ﬁgure 5, policy actions were much more volatile prior to 1993.
One ﬁnal cut of the data is between Democratic and Republican presiden-
tial administrations.19 The last six columns of table 3 present results for
the surplus and its components for Republican and Democratic presiden-
tial administrations. What is striking about these results is how similar
they are. There are no differences of any importance for any of the coefﬁ-
cients. Although this may be merely a ﬂuke of the sample period consid-
ered, it does suggest that, except perhaps for the occasional “revolution,”
Alan J. Auerbach 93
19. For this sample there are only ﬁve observations for which a majority in Congress
and the president were of the same party, so the table does not present results for this addi-
tional sample split.
Figure 5. Residuals from Regressions Explaining Legislated Changes 
in the Federal Budget Surplus, 1982–2002
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
b. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act.
–1.5
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Percent of GDP
Surplus
Spending
1990 budget summit
OBRA93
a
EGTRRA
b Revenue
Reagan 1981-82
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 93T
a
b
l
e
 
3
.
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
E
x
p
l
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
L
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
e
d
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
S
u
r
p
l
u
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
,
 
b
y
 
S
u
b
p
e
r
i
o
d
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
1
9
8
4
:
2
–
1
9
8
4
:
2
–
1
9
9
3
:
2
–
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
n
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
2
0
0
3
:
1
1
9
9
3
:
1
2
0
0
3
:
1
1
9
8
4
:
2
–
1
9
9
3
:
1
,
 
2
0
0
1
:
2
–
2
0
0
3
:
1
1
9
9
3
:
2
–
2
0
0
1
:
1
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
S
u
r
p
l
u
s
S
u
r
p
l
u
s
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
S
u
r
p
l
u
s
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
S
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
–
0
.
0
0
2
–
0
.
0
0
7
–
0
.
0
0
2
–
0
.
0
0
3
–
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
2
–
0
.
0
0
2
–
0
.
0
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
1
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
L
a
g
g
e
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
g
a
p
b
–
0
.
1
1
5
–
0
.
1
7
0
–
0
.
1
5
0
–
0
.
1
0
4
–
0
.
0
2
5
0
.
0
7
8
–
0
.
1
1
7
–
0
.
0
3
6
0
.
0
8
1
(
0
.
0
3
8
)
(
0
.
0
9
7
)
(
0
.
0
3
1
)
(
0
.
0
5
5
)
(
0
.
0
2
8
)
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
(
0
.
0
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
e
d
 
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
c
–
0
.
1
4
1
–
0
.
2
7
8
–
0
.
1
7
6
–
0
.
1
5
6
–
0
.
0
6
9
0
.
0
8
7
–
0
.
1
4
1
–
0
.
0
4
5
0
.
0
9
6
(
0
.
0
2
7
)
(
0
.
1
6
1
)
(
0
.
0
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
3
8
)
(
0
.
0
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
3
)
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
R
2
0
.
4
3
3
0
.
0
6
9
0
.
7
6
9
0
.
4
1
4
0
.
3
7
2
0
.
2
5
3
0
.
6
3
8
0
.
0
7
2
0
.
6
9
7
N
o
.
 
o
f
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
3
8
1
8
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
6
1
6
1
6
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
t
h
o
r
’
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
C
B
O
 
d
a
t
a
.
 
a
.
T
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
e
d
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
,
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
,
 
o
r
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
a
 
s
e
m
i
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
b
a
s
i
s
,
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
f
u
l
l
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
G
D
P
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
b
.
D
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
i
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
1
.
c
.
D
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
i
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 94relatively stable behavioral rules apply across superﬁcially different bud-
get regimes and different ideologies.
Given that these policy changes are organized in the form that pro-
posed legislation typically is, in terms of annual changes in revenue and
expenditure during a multiyear budget period, it is simple to calculate
what the estimates in table 3 would predict for current policy, that is, the
legislative actions that one would expect to be taken between the winter
and summer of 2003. Using estimates for the period since 1993:2, and
assuming that any expenditure or revenue changes adopted would be per-
manent, constant as a fraction of GDP beginning in 2004, and half that
large this year (because the change occurs at approximately midyear), the
predicted undiscounted net budget cost of policy changes during the bud-
get period 2004–13 (the common way of reporting these changes in the
press) would be $368 billion, composed of a tax cut of $148 billion and a
spending increase of $220 billion over the full period. The ﬁrst full year
would have a tax cut of $12 billion and an expenditure increase of $17 bil-
lion. These relatively small changes reﬂect the fact that the estimated out-
put gap is not large, whereas the budget is already in deﬁcit and projected
to be so for the next few years, at least. By contrast, the president’s recent
budget would involve a ten-year reduction in tax revenue of $1,455 bil-
lion and an expenditure increase of $725 billion net of interest.20 Of
course, proposal is not enactment, and so one would expect the coefﬁ-
cients to imply a smaller change in expected value.21
One potential problem with the results based on changes in baseline
expenditure is that it is not always clear when actual policy changes.
Throughout the 1990s, Congress adopted successive expenditure caps,
and CBO projections reﬂected each update. But extending existing caps
should not be treated as a change in policy, if such an extension was
expected. In the other direction, the breaching of the spending caps in
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20. CBO (2003b, table 8). The expenditure number equals the CBO’s ten-year total of
$1,255 billion less $530 billion in interest. Treating all of the interest as added debt service
(for which there is no separate entry) probably overstates the appropriate adjustment, as
some of the increased interest expenses may result from an induced increase in interest rates.
21. On the other hand, the most recent CBO forecast (CBO, 2003b) lists increased dis-
cretionary and mandatory spending of $22 billion for ﬁscal year 2004 and $248 billion for
the ten-year budget period 2004–13, based on policy changes already adopted since the
January forecast. As this volume goes to press, the president has signed into law the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act, with tax cuts ofﬁcially estimated at $350
billion over ten years.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 95recent years, leading to continual upward revisions of projected spending,
may not have been true policy changes, either.
To address this ambiguity, I consider yet another measure of policy:
the actual behavior of discretionary spending over the years, starting in
1963.22 Table 4 relates actual year-to-year changes in discretionary spend-
ing to the preceding year’s output gap and budget surplus, all relative to
full-employment GDP. Although this exercise has the advantage of con-
sidering actual spending changes, a disadvantage is that it necessarily
uses data at an annual frequency, which is even less appropriate for con-
sideration of cyclical timing than the semiannual frequency of the data
analyzed above.23
The left half of the table presents estimates for all discretionary spend-
ing. For the full sample and the period starting in 1984 (ﬁrst two
columns), the coefﬁcients on the output gap and the budget surplus both
have the predicted sign but are small and estimated imprecisely. For the
period from 1984 to 1992 (third column), there is no discernable relation-
ship at all. For the period starting in 1993, however, there is a sharp
increase in both coefﬁcients (which are also both signiﬁcant), indicating a
much more reactive policy stance. The right half of the table presents esti-
mates for nondefense discretionary spending alone, for which the simple
model used here might be more applicable. Indeed, the results are more
stable over time for this measure of spending, although there is still a
stronger response in recent years. One should be cautious given the small
number of observations, but the ﬁndings in this table are generally consis-
tent with those in table 1, indicating that policy has been more responsive
since 1984 and, with respect to the budget gap, particularly so since 1993.
Table 3, on the other hand, shows no increase in the responsiveness of
actual policy changes to the budget gap since 1993, but differences in the
methodologies make it difﬁcult to identify the reason.
Overall, then, various pieces of evidence indicate that ﬁscal policy has
been responsive to both ﬁscal and macroeconomic conditions, and possi-
bly more responsive in recent decades than previously. Whatever the
intellectual developments regarding the efﬁcacy of countercyclical
policy, policymakers are still Keynesians, and spending and revenue do
96 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
22. The CBO publishes data starting in 1962, which makes 1963 the earliest possible
starting date that can take lags into account.
23. Given that the focus is on discretionary spending, one would not expect the changes
in spending to include automatic responses to cyclical factors.
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1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 97react to the budget situation, as measured by current and projected
surpluses. 
Tax Policy and Investment
Thus far I have considered changes in ﬁscal policy as measured by
expenditure and overall tax revenue. Although this aggregation of rev-
enue is common in the literature, one would not expect all current changes
in tax revenue to have the same effect on output. The impact would
depend on the type of tax being changed, as well as on the inferences pri-
vate agents make from the change about future tax policy. Perhaps the
most important illustration of these differences in tax policy effects con-
cerns investment incentives. For forward-looking investors, changes in
tax revenue—even those to corporate tax revenue—due to changes in leg-
islation may be a very poor measure of changes in the incentive to invest.
Different provisions that impose the same tax burden on new investment,
in present value, may yield very different patterns of tax revenue over
time and very different ﬁrst-year revenue effects. Indeed, different provi-
sions that have the same impact on new investment need not raise the
same amount of revenue in present value, after taking into account the
taxes on existing assets. Further, expected changes in tax provisions can
themselves exert a powerful impact on the incentive to invest. Whereas
standard models of consumption lead us to expect that temporary provi-
sions will have muted effects, the opposite is true of investment incen-
tives. A temporary reduction in the effective price of a durable investment
good can have large incentive effects, and policies may seek to take
advantage of this.
A good illustration of this distinction is the stimulus bill passed in
early 2002. The primary change was the introduction, for a period of
three years, of expensing (instead of regular depreciation) for 30 percent
of purchases of investment goods with tax lifetimes of twenty years or
less. As a form of accelerated depreciation, this policy would have a
larger revenue effect in the short run than in the long run, even if it were
enacted permanently. The additional deductions for investment made
several years from now would be offset by smaller deductions in those
years on earlier investment that had already been partly expensed. Thus
98 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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tax incentives for capital investment, which would remain constant after
enactment. As enacted, however, the provision encourages a shift in the
timing of investment to occur within the three-year window. Clearly,
neither the policy change itself nor its potential impact on investment is
adequately summarized by a one-year change in revenue. This is particu-
larly important given the volatility of investment relative to other com-
ponents of GDP.24
Figure 6 graphs net nonresidential investment in structures and in
equipment since 1954 as shares of nominal GDP. The pattern of equip-
ment investment since the early 1990s is particularly noteworthy: this
component rose sharply from a trough during the 1990–91 recession to a
historical high, then fell precipitously in 2001. The motivation for the
2002 legislation is evident. But measuring the effect of this and other pol-
icy changes requires a model of investment behavior.
To begin, consider the standard Hall-Jorgenson user cost of capital,
which provides a measure of the required gross, before-tax return to capi-
tal, and hence a measure of the incentive to use capital in production,
under the assumption of instantaneous adjustment. For a constant-tax sys-
tem, the user cost is
where p is the price of output, q is the price of new capital goods, ρ is the
nominal discount rate, δ is the exponential rate at which capital actually
depreciates, k is the investment tax credit, τ is the corporate tax rate, and
z is the present value of depreciation allowances per dollar of capital pur-
chased. If one modiﬁes the assumptions to incorporate changes in tax pol-
icy, the user cost of capital becomes 
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24. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Alesina and others (2002) have found, using vec-
tor autoregression models, that aggregate tax shocks inﬂuence investment, but it is unclear
to what extent these shocks act through changes in the incentive to invest, rather than
through other channels.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 99where Γ equals the sum of the investment tax credit and the present value
of tax savings from depreciation deductions.25 The presence of the addi-
tional term on the right-hand side of equation 2 means that there is now a
second way in which tax policy may affect investment, namely, through
expected changes in policy, as well as through current policy. For exam-
ple, the expected elimination of an investment tax credit has a powerful
effect on the user cost of capital as computed from equation 2, because it
induces a huge capital gain at the time of the credit’s elimination. Thus
the introduction of an investment tax credit that is expected to be tempo-
rary has two effects that encourage investment—through the tax credit
itself as well as through its expected elimination—which together can be
thought of as corresponding to changes in the desired level of capital as
well as changes in the desired timing of capital purchases.
100 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
25. See Auerbach (1983a). This sum equals k +τ z if τ is constant over time. If τ is
expected to change over time, then the present value of tax savings from depreciation
deductions is not the simple product of the current value of τ and the present value of
depreciation deductions z.
Figure 6. Net Nonresidential Investment, 1954–2001
Source: BEA, National Income and Product Accounts.
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taneous capital stock adjustment. Optimal investment behavior in the
presence of convex adjustment costs may be characterized by a partial-
adjustment investment process in which the desired capital stock at date t
varies inversely with the weighted average of the current and expected
future user costs of capital based on equation 2:26
where the weights wi sum to unity and decline exponentially, at a rate that
is inversely related to the size of adjustment costs; the more sluggish the
investment response, the more the future matters. Estimates by Auerbach
and Kevin Hassett indicate that it is reasonable to assume an annual decay
rate of 0.5 in calculating the weights.27
Figure 7 traces estimated changes since 1954 in the user cost of capital
for equipment investment under two alternative assumptions about
expected tax law changes: under one assumption, investors myopically
expect the tax law to remain constant (equation 1); under the second,
investors have perfect foresight with respect to future tax law changes
(equations 2 and 3). These estimates, whose construction is described in
appendix A, take into account the changing composition of the capital
stock over time and assume a constant required real rate of return 
ρ – ∆q/q. Therefore they do not incorporate the effects on the required
return of changes in individual taxes or in interest rates. However, the most
important tax provisions affecting investment have been investment tax
credits and depreciation provisions, not changes in corporate or individual
tax rates; the level of interest rates is part of the macroeconomic environ-
ment to which one might expect tax policy to respond, and this calls for
constructing a measure of policy that is not a function of the interest rate.
A number of patterns in ﬁgure 7 are worth mentioning. First, the ﬂuc-
tuations in the perfect-foresight user cost are substantially larger, even
though they are smoothed by averaging. Second, policy has been quiet
since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the investment tax credit
and adjusted depreciation allowances. Third, the distribution of policy
shocks by this measure is poorly approximated by a normal distribution.
() * , – 3 cE w c tt s t s
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≥ ∑
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26. As shown in Auerbach (1989).
27. Auerbach and Hassett (1992).
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determinants of these policy changes. Instead I estimate an ordered probit,
with the three states being a substantial reduction in the user cost, no sub-
stantial change in the user cost, and a substantial increase in the user cost.
For the myopic user cost of capital, I set the cutoffs at 0.005, so that
changes in the user cost with an absolute value of less than 0.5 percentage
point are treated as no change in policy. This counts all important legisla-
tion as a tax change but leaves out minor changes in law and changes in
the present value of depreciation deductions due to changes in the annual
inﬂation rate.28
102 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
28. An alternative approach to estimating the effects of the economy on policy is found
in Auerbach and Hines (1988), who assumed that the decision to effect a policy change was
independent of economic conditions. For the period 1953–85 they estimated a linear model
based only on the years in which major changes occurred, with the key variable in the user
cost expression, Γ/(1 – τ), as the dependent variable.
Figure 7. Changes in the User Cost of Capital for Equipment under Alternative
Expectations Assumptions, 1954–2002
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Calculated from equations 2 and 3 as described in appendix A.
b. Calculated from equation 1 as described in appendix A.
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1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 102Table 5 reports the results for this case of myopic user costs.29 Inde-
pendent variables include, as above, the lagged annual budget surplus and
the lagged output gap, both relative to potential GDP, plus, for each type
of investment, its own lagged value and the lagged change in that value,
both as percentages of GDP. The estimates suggest that investment incen-
tives have responded to both the output gap and the budget surplus: the
coefﬁcients on the output gap are signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, whereas
those on the surplus are less precisely estimated but still, in general, at
least marginally signiﬁcant. For equipment investment, investment condi-
tions also play a role, when speciﬁed as the lagged change in investment.
The modest investment incentives introduced into the tax code in 2002
were consistent with the model in column 5-2 of table 5, which, because
of the very large drop in net equipment investment, put the probability of
a tax reduction in that year at close to 1. For the current year, given the
continuing drop in net equipment investment from 2001 to 2002,30 the
model assigns a further cut in the myopic user cost a probability of just
over 0.5 and assigns an increase a probability close to zero.
Thus the myopic user cost of capital appears to respond to the same
basic determinants as simple changes in revenue and expenditure and, for
equipment investment, to particular investment conditions as well. But
this does not necessarily imply that the incentive to invest behaves this
way. Recall that forward-looking investors should also be concerned with
future values of the user cost, and thus with possible changes in tax rules.
If accelerated depreciation incentives are made more generous again in
2003, investors’ anticipation of this could have undercut the effects of the
2002 provisions.
If, in the extreme, investors had perfect foresight, the volatile,
forward-looking user costs shown in figure 7 would characterize the
incentive to invest. An ordered probit model for changes in this concept
of the user cost yields quite different results from those in table 5. None of
the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation, for a broad range of
Alan J. Auerbach 103
29. The coefﬁcient µ is an estimate of the cutoff between the second category (no
change) and the third category (cost-of-capital increase), with the cutoff between the ﬁrst
two categories normalized to zero and the indicators ranging between 1 (decrease) and
3 (increase).
30. As the BEA has not yet released an estimate for net investment for calendar year
2002, I impute a value by assuming that the difference between net and gross equipment
investment, as a percentage of GDP, is the same for 2002 as for 2001.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 103assumed cutoff values (results not shown).31 This suggests that policy
actions, as they have been taken, may not have inﬂuenced the incentive to
invest in a countercyclical manner, even if the changes were timed to be
countercyclical.
State and Local Responses to Economic and Fiscal Conditions
As discussed above, state and local governments are facing unprece-
dented ﬁscal imbalances. Although it is customary to focus primarily on
104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
31. Values of 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, and 0.02 were considered.
Table 5. Ordered Probit Analysis of Changes in Tax Policy Affecting 
Investment Incentivesa
Dependent variable
Myopic user cost  Myopic user cost  Myopic user cost 
of capital  of capital  of capital 
Independent
for equipment for structures for both
variable 5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-6
Constant –0.068 0.890 1.818 1.488 0.640 1.212
(0.942) (0.410) (1.205) (0.588) (1.123) (0.434)
Lagged surplusb –29.145 –26.681 –39.994 –37.675 –31.623 –35.500
(14.240) (15.889) (26.475) (27.721) (16.856) (18.022)
Lagged output gapb –24.678 –24.658 –51.819 –61.212 –41.952 –46.225
(12.096) (11.342) (20.597) (24.496) (14.544) (15.025)
Lagged net  35.942 –25.363 13.969
investmentc (47.331) (59.014) (29.309)
Lagged change in  198.373 –133.759 0.637
investmentd (66.597) (137.007) (0.393)
µe 2.650 3.248 4.996 5.558 3.500 3.789
(0.412) (0.559) (1.197) (1.526) (0.613) (0.713)
Summary statistics
Scaled R2 0.203 0.441 0.264 0.286 0.300 0.358
No. of observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
Source: Author’s regressions using CBO data. 
a. The dependent variable is the annual change in the myopic user cost of capital for the indicated type of investment. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
b. Deﬁned as in table 1 except that the data are annual. 
c. Value of the indicated type of investment, net of depreciation, in the previous year. 
d. Change in value of the indicated type of investment in the previous year.
e. Estimate of the cutoff between the second category (no change) and the third category (cost-of-capital increase), with the
cutoff between the ﬁrst two categories normalized to zero and the indicators ranging between 1 (decrease) and 3 (increase).
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 104the federal budget when contemplating the interaction of ﬁscal policy and
the economic cycle, the magnitude of the problem facing state and local
governments today and the large responses that this problem may induce
call for a closer look.
One would expect changes in policy at the state and local level not to
be heavily inﬂuenced by cyclical factors. The reason is that most states
face restrictions on the deﬁcits they can run,32 apart from whether individ-
ual states would wish to attempt countercyclical measures if they could.
Indeed, a regression of the change in the aggregate state and local full-
employment surplus (depicted in ﬁgure 3) on the lagged output gap and
the lagged surplus (all divided by full-employment GDP),
∆SURPLUSFE = 0.002 + 0.007*GAP(–1) – 0.100*SURPLUS(–1)
(0.015) (0.005) (0.042)
Adjusted R2 = 0.105; N = 98,
indicates that, as at the federal level, the lagged budget surplus has a neg-
ative impact on changes in the current surplus. Unlike at the federal level,
however, the output gap has no negative effect.
Because, as previously argued, the change in the full-employment sur-
plus has many problems as a measure of policy, I consider again a mea-
sure based on explicit policy actions. The measure comes from the
National Association of State Budget Ofﬁcers, which each year publishes
The Fiscal Survey of the States. James Poterba has previously used these
data to analyze state responses to ﬁscal shocks during 1988–92, and I fol-
low a related approach for the period 1988–2002.33 For each state in each
budget year, the survey reports actual general fund revenue and expendi-
ture, and hence the actual surplus and the associated change in the general
fund balance. It also reports projected revenue, projected expenditure, 
and the projected surplus for the coming year and, after the ﬁscal year has
ended, changes in outlays adopted and implemented during the year and
the revenue effects of tax legislation enacted during the year for the next
ﬁscal year. That is, for year t, we have the revenue and expenditure pro-
jected at the end of the previous year, which I will call t–1Rt and  t–1Et,
Alan J. Auerbach 105
32. See the discussion in Poterba (1994).
33. Poterba (1994). I am grateful to Kim Rueben and James Poterba for providing an
updated version of their data. Another potential data source for state ﬁscal actions is the
National Conference of State Legislatures.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 105respectively; the legislated change in outlays in year t that takes effect in
year t, t∆ELt; and the legislated change in revenue in year t that takes effect
in year t + 1, t∆RLt+1. Following Poterba, I impute revenue changes enacted
and implemented in year t, t∆RLt, by scaling the value of t∆RLt+1 by the
fraction of the year remaining in year t when each provision was enacted.
To review, for each ﬁscal year and each state, data exist for a measure
of the projected surplus, the actual surplus, expenditure changes adopted
and implemented during the year, and revenue changes adopted during
the year and implemented the following year, which can also be used to
impute revenue changes adopted and implemented during the year.
Although there may be useful independent variation across states in dif-
ferent ﬁscal circumstances, I focus primarily on the aggregate data, to
make the analysis comparable to that for the federal government.
The ﬁrst three columns of table 6 report regressions explaining aggre-
gate state policy changes in revenue during the current year, changes in
revenue during the next year, and changes in expenditure during the cur-
rent year, as a function of three explanatory variables: the lagged value of
the national output gap (the same measure used in the previous tables), the
change in the aggregate general fund balance over the course of the previ-
ous year (roughly equal to that year’s aggregate state budget surplus),34
and the projected surplus for the current year, made at the beginning of
the year. All variables are expressed as fractions of potential GDP. The
speciﬁcation is similar to that in the third column of table 2 except that,
for federal changes, the projected surplus incorporates forecasts not only
for the current ﬁscal year, but also for several future years. As expected,
the lagged output gap has a very small and insigniﬁcant impact; its omis-
sion from the estimates in the middle three columns produces higher val-
ues of the adjusted R2 but little other effect.Fiscal conditions, on the other
hand, have a powerful impact, particularly if one focuses on taxes next
106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
34. The general fund budget surplus is not exactly equal to the change in the general
fund balance, because states use budget stabilization funds to make transfers in and out of
the general fund. It is not clear which measure of the change in the budget situation is more
relevant. If states have substantial funds available to cover declines in the general fund, it
may be appropriate for the measure used here to reﬂect this, because the actual change in
the general fund balance does. In any event, the two measures have a correlation coefﬁcient
of 0.9 over the period considered. Using the actual lagged surplus instead of the change in
the general fund balance changes the relative magnitudes of the coefﬁcients on the lagged
and the projected surplus (the projected surplus has a bigger impact, and the lagged surplus
a smaller one) but has little impact on the overall picture.
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1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 107year and outlays in the current year. The lagged budget surplus has an
enormous implied effect on revenue and outlays: the combined effect of
its point estimates is above 1. The projected surplus for the current year
has an additional impact in the same direction, although the impact for
revenue is not signiﬁcant.35
Finally, one may consider the effects of contemporaneous budget
shocks on ﬁscal decisions. Again following the approach taken by
Poterba, I deﬁne shocks to the surplus during the current year as the total
change in the surplus minus the policy change in the surplus already mea-
sured. This approach is analogous to decomposing federal budget forecast
revisions into legislative and nonlegislative (economic and technical)
changes, as done above, and then considering the impact of nonlegislative
changes on concurrent legislative ones. In general, an issue of simultane-
ity must be considered: causality can run in both directions. Indeed, at the
federal level, there is evidence that policy shocks have an impact on out-
put within the same quarter,36 so that policy changes during a given period
would also inﬂuence the change in the surplus attributable to cyclical fac-
tors. In this case, regressing policy changes on nonpolicy changes in the
surplus would not identify the impact of shocks on the policy process. I
am not aware of similar evidence regarding the timing of the impact of
state policy shocks on the aggregate economy, and so it is difﬁcult to
know how serious a problem this is. However, for the sake of comparison
with the earlier use of these data, the last three columns of table 6 add the
concurrent shock to the aggregate state surplus as an explanatory variable.
The estimated coefﬁcients are all signiﬁcant and quite consistent with
those reported by Poterba, despite differences in the other explanatory
variables, in the sample period, and in the method of estimation (panel
data versus aggregate time series).37 But the impact of this additional vari-
able is offset by weaker estimated effects of the others, so that the overall
picture does not change appreciably.38
108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
35. The effect on outlays is particularly striking, given that the variable as reported
includes only outlay reductions. This should attenuate the estimated relationship between
the variable and the surplus. See Poterba (1994, footnote 10) for further discussion.
36. Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
37. Reestimates of the equations in table 6 using panel data give results that are gener-
ally consistent with the time series results, although the coefﬁcients are typically smaller in
absolute value.
38. The fact that coefﬁcients on the other variables change indicates that the budget
shocks are not true shocks, in the sense of being unpredictable from prior information.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 108In summary, state governments appear even more responsive to their
own budget conditions than the federal government does to its. This is
consistent with the tighter restrictions on the typical state’s budget
process. The estimates in table 6 imply that enormous ﬁscal changes are
to be expected at the state level in the current ﬁscal year: the results in the
middle three columns of the table imply tax increases of $4 billion this
year and $22 billion next year, and current-year spending cuts of $24 bil-
lion. The full-year response of spending cuts and tax increases is actually
larger than the federal tax cuts and spending increases implied by the
model presented above, indicating that the state fiscal situation, indeed,
is more than a sideshow for macroeconomic policy in the current fiscal
environment.
“The Real Fiscal Danger”
Tables 2 and 3 showed that policy actions are forward looking to some
extent: projected future surpluses affect current policy decisions. But dis-
counted near-term surpluses are an inadequate measure of long-run ﬁscal
balance, and this is particularly true at present. As already discussed, the
United States faces huge implicit liabilities due to growth in old-age enti-
tlement programs and a changing population age structure. The true ﬁscal
imbalance may be expressed in terms of the implicit liabilities cited above
or as a fraction of GDP. One recent calculation puts the annual ﬁscal gap
at between 4.4 and 7.8 percent of GDP, depending on how “current pol-
icy” is deﬁned.39 Another arrives at a gap of 6.5 percent of GDP in 2003.40
Some object to the use of such comprehensive measures, which require
making tax and spending projections far into the future. But virtually the
entire measured long-term ﬁscal imbalance is attributable to age- and
health-related entitlement programs for which long-term planning is
already institutionalized.41 If one wishes to use the standard seventy-ﬁve-
year horizon for which projections are made for Social Security and
Alan J. Auerbach 109
39. See Auerbach and others (forthcoming).
40. See Gokhale and Smetters (2003).
41. Gokhale and Smetters (2003) report that less than $1 trillion of an inﬁnite-horizon
ﬁscal liability of over $40 trillion is attributable to the rest of government. This may over-
state the problem somewhat, and understate the surplus from the rest of government, to the
extent that there may be a surge in future tax payments as the result of fully taxable distri-
butions from tax-deferred retirement savings vehicles. Boskin (2003) has estimated that the
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 109Medicare, it is more accurate to concentrate on the “closed group” liabili-
ties of these programs, that is, the present value of future beneﬁts net of
future contributions of existing age cohorts already participating in the
programs, rather than include all taxes and beneﬁts over the period as in
the budget calculations cited above. The truncation at seventy-ﬁve years
has little impact when only current participants are considered, but it
leads to an understatement of the liabilities to future participants, because
it truncates their beneﬁts—which come later in life—more than it does
their taxes.
The change in the closed-group liability from one year to the next
equals the sum of two terms: increases in liabilities to those remaining in
the system plus the difference between liabilities to those entering the sys-
tem and liabilities to those leaving the system. Changes in the closed-
group liability give us a clear measure of the change in the implicit
entitlement debt from one year to the next—the implicit deﬁcit.42 The col-
umn labeled “Implicit debt” in table 7 provides a short time series of the
closed-group liability for Social Security’s OASDI (Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance) system since 1997.43 The table also shows that
the annual implicit deﬁcits, measured as the change in the implicit debt,
have been substantially larger than the accumulating off-budget surpluses
in the OASDI trust fund. One can learn more by breaking down these
annual deﬁcits into changes in the implicit debt attributable to updated
assumptions (about interest rates, productivity growth, and the like) and
those attributable to the incremental change in the base year for which
the calculation is done. The component attributable to changes in
assumptions shows no clear pattern, although it is large in absolute value
in some years. For example, between the 1998 and 1999 reports, favor-
110 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
present value of such deferred taxes was nearly $3 trillion at the end of 2002—a large num-
ber in absolute terms, but not relative to the size of the implicit entitlement liabilities being
considered here.
42. This implicit deﬁcit measure is consistent with the nominal basis on which deﬁcit
accounting is currently done, although it could be expressed in real terms by subtracting the
increase in the implicit debt that is due to inﬂation.
43. The liabilities reported here track reasonably well those reported by the U.S. Trea-
sury (2003, p. 65, calculated as the difference between future beneﬁts and future taxes for
current participants reported there) for the last three years: $9.6 trillion, $10.5 trillion, and
$11.2 trillion. The 2003 OASDI trustees’ report, issued on March 17, 2003, puts the current
closed-group liability even higher, at $11.9 trillion (U.S. Social Security Administration,
2003, p. 63).
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 110able changes in assumptions regarding productivity growth, employ-
ment, and fertility sharply reduced growth in the implicit liability. The
improvement between 2002 and 2003 appears to be due in part to an
increase in the projected population in the 2000 census. The component
attributable to the annual advance in the base year, on the other hand, is
always positive and very large. By itself, this component would cause the
implicit debt to grow much faster than GDP, reﬂecting the fact that, as the
baby-boom cohort nears retirement and the collection of beneﬁts, the pre-
sent value of this bulge in beneﬁts is becoming larger and larger.
The government’s implicit long-term liabilities are more than twice as
large if one considers the Medicare system as well (not shown).44 These
enormous liabilities have implications for both policy decisions and pol-
icy evaluation. Private agents taking these liabilities into account are
likely to respond differently to short-run policy actions than they would
otherwise. For example, as discussed below, tax cuts might have weak or
even negative demand effects if they are viewed as unsustainable. If pri-
vate agents can be expected to behave differently in the face of long-term
imbalances, optimal government policy should adapt as well; it may be
pointless, for example, to enact a tax cut in an attempt to stimulate the
Alan J. Auerbach 111
44. The U.S. Treasury (2003, p. 65) estimates the combined closed-group liability of
Medicare parts A (hospital insurance) and B (supplementary medical insurance) at
$12.5 trillion at the end of 2001 and $12.9 trillion at the end of 2002. This gives a combined
closed-group liability for OASDI and Medicare of $24.1 trillion at the end of 2002.
Table 7. Implicit Debt and Deﬁcits of the OASDI System, 1997–2003
Billions of dollars
Change in implicit debt in 
current year due to change in
Implicit debt  Base Projection Implicit 
Year at start of year year assumptions deﬁcit
1997 7,724 523 –97 426
1998 8,151 581 –408 173
1999 8,324 604 161 765
2000 9,089 677 201 878
2001 9,967 731 –27 704
2002 10,671 731 –328 403
2003 11,074
Source: Author’s calculations, described in appendix B.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 111economy. Even if private agents have short horizons, the implicit liabili-
ties still restrict the scope of available policy choices and could inﬂuence
government actions. If they do, estimated equations based on ofﬁcial sur-
plus projections for an earlier period when such implicit liabilities were
smaller will not perform well. On the other hand, recent actions by policy-
makers offer little compelling evidence of this type of prudence.
A quite relevant question is whether the method of calculating the
deﬁcit for ofﬁcial purposes affects policy decisions. It is a reasonable con-
jecture that a much larger “ofﬁcial” deﬁcit would restrain government
behavior, even though the information such a statement would provide is
already available. Another question is whether current private asset val-
ues, which should be inﬂuenced by expectations about future policy,
rationally reﬂect the ﬁscal and monetary policy paths that will be needed
to deal with the current ﬁscal imbalance. Should the stock market be as
high as it is, or long-term interest rates as low as they are, given the prob-
ability of much higher taxes or inﬂation?
Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy
Armed with this knowledge about how ﬁscal policy has reacted to the
economic and ﬁscal situation in the past, what can we say about the effec-
tiveness of policy, in the past and potentially in the future, at stabilizing
the economy? The answer is far from obvious and is difﬁcult to pin down.
The reasons for this difﬁculty are not new and have been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature,45 but they deserve a quick summary review, par-
ticularly in light of renewed enthusiasm about “dynamic scoring” of tax
and expenditure proposals, which incorporates the induced macro-
economic effects of policy changes on revenue and spending in the esti-
mated budget costs of such proposals.46 The CBO has recently taken a
step in this direction: its evaluation of the president’s ﬁscal year 2004
budget proposals includes a range of estimates of the feedback effects on
the budget.47 Further efforts in this direction are likely and should be
informed by the empirical difﬁculties.
45. See Cochrane (1994), for example, for a citation of important early contributions
and a discussion of many of the points raised here.
46. For further discussion and evaluation, see Auerbach (1996).
47. CBO (2003b).
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relevant observations are generated limits what we can learn. The most
convincing evidence presented above is based on data at annual or semi-
annual frequencies. A policy that reacts to the previous year’s output gap
might not be well timed to smooth output ﬂuctuations, whereas a policy
reaction to the previous quarter’s gap might. Also, one needs to know
how ﬁscal policy has interacted with monetary policy. But perhaps the
most challenging problem is determining how policy changes affect the
economy.
The various challenges to modeling ﬁscal policy’s impact can be illus-
trated with reference to a simple vector autoregression model of output Y
and a ﬁscal policy aggregate F:
where X = [Y, F] and εt is the vector of shocks to the two variables at date
t. Such models, typically including some measure of monetary policy as
well, are common in the literature.48 What can estimates of such a system
tell us about the effects of ﬁscal policy?
Dealing with Contemporaneous Shocks
The regression results presented above relate policy changes to
beginning-of-period information. As already emphasized, the ability to
act more quickly to news as it develops during the period could be crucial
to stabilization attempts. But because economic and policy shocks are
contemporaneous elements of the vector εt, it is difﬁcult to determine the
extent to which policy is reacting to economic news, or economic news is
reacting to policy, or both.
With additional information, one can make reasonable assumptions
about the relationship between the two variables. For example, discre-
tionary policy changes of the kind reported in CBO revisions might not be
inﬂuenced by economic changes within the period;49 the budget surplus,
purged of an automatic cyclical component that is commonly estimated,
might be independent of current economic shocks.50 In each case one can
() ( ) , – 4 1 XG X tt t =+ ε
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48. See, for example, Romer and Romer (1994) or Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
49. This restriction is suggested by Hayashi (2002).
50. This is the approach taken by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 113then estimate the effects of these policy changes on contemporaneous
economic outcomes. But the data may not come at a high enough fre-
quency for such assumptions to make sense, and the assumptions are
questionable for other reasons. As discussed above, the CBO’s estimates
of changes due to policy, particularly on the spending side, might not rep-
resent policy changes actually occurring in that period—an example is an
extension of the budget caps. Moreover, the full-employment deﬁcit, even
conditional on its own past values and those of output, can change for
reasons that have nothing to do with policy, such as a shift in the income
distribution.
How Does Fiscal Policy Affect Output?
An equation that simply relates output to lagged values of output and
ﬁscal policy is inadequate for identifying how different components of
policy affect output. For example, how does one distinguish the impact of
automatic ﬁscal stabilizers from that of policy surprises that could not be
predicted using contemporaneous income? One might think that a pre-
dictable tax reduction would have a smaller impact on consumption than
an unpredictable one, if consumption smoothing begins when the reduc-
tion is ﬁrst anticipated. The coefﬁcient on lagged policy can only be iden-
tiﬁed by the existence of policy shocks; if income could predict all policy
changes, the effect of policy could not be estimated independently. Thus
one cannot know how much of the coefﬁcient on lagged income is attrib-
utable to automatic stabilizers and other predictable elements of policy
(such as the decision rules estimated above) unless one makes assump-
tions about the relationship between the effects of predictable and those of
unpredictable policy changes, or ﬁnds instruments for the predictable pol-
icy changes that do not belong in the equation explaining output. This
makes it difﬁcult to say whether past policy actions have stabilized out-
put, because we likely do not have a model that is invariant to changes in
policy rules.
What Is the Right Measure of Fiscal Policy?
Parsimonious models of the impact of government policy on output
use aggregate measures of fiscal policy, such as the budget surplus, rev-
enue, and expenditure. Using aggregate revenue as a measure of the
impact of taxes might make sense if the world corresponded closely to a
114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 114representative-agent model with lump-sum taxes. But this approach does
not allow us to determine whether tax cuts will have a different impact if
they go to the rich rather than the poor, for example, nor does it tell us
how the economic incentives to invest, save, and engage in other activi-
ties have changed. In principle, several measures of ﬁscal policy need to
be included simultaneously, but the individual effects would likely prove
difﬁcult to estimate precisely. This is particularly so because some of the
measures, such as the incentive to invest, would depend critically on
expectations about future tax parameters.
How Can We Measure the Impact of Expectations?
Perhaps the most difﬁcult problem in estimating the impact of ﬁscal
policy is the role of expectations. Will a tax cut be permanent? Will new
investment incentives be temporary? Will the government have to raise
taxes in the future? The answers to all these questions should affect cur-
rent behavior, but expectations typically are difﬁcult to assess. Models
that omit expectations may be very unstable, as has been clearly under-
stood since the work of Robert Lucas.51 Estimated effects of policy
“shocks,” measured as unpredictable changes in current ﬁscal variables,
can vary depending on how these current shocks inﬂuence expectations.
One can attempt to deal with this by including additional variables in the
regression that might proxy for expectations,52 but these proxies will be
imperfect; one can estimate relationships for different sample periods
based on prior beliefs about within-period stability,53 but such divisions
will be arbitrary and leave much uncertainty about which “regime” pre-
vails at present.
Fiscal policy in the 1990s offers a good illustration of the difﬁculty of
incorporating the effects of expectations. In mid-1993 the Clinton admin-
istration pushed through a modest increase in federal taxes,54 and Con-
gress extended the discretionary spending caps that had been introduced
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51. Lucas (1976).
52. For example, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002) include the CBO budget surplus
projections in equations to explain the long-term interest rate.
53. For example, Perotti (1999) suggests that increases in the current surplus should
have more expansionary effects on expectations during periods of ﬁscal stress, and he
therefore divides his sample period according to this criterion.
54. According to the CBO (1993), the impact of the tax legislation in its ﬁrst full ﬁscal
year of implementation, 1995, was $44 billion, or 0.6 percent of GDP.
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 115in 1990. This began a prolonged period of falling federal deﬁcits, declin-
ing long-term interest rates, and expanding output. The decline in long-
term interest rates and the vibrant economic expansion are often attributed
to the Clinton policy program.55 Long-term interest rates did indeed trend
downward throughout the Clinton administration.
The literature has made quite clear that the apparently paradoxical idea
of an expansionary budget contraction rests on expectations.56 If agents
believe that current ﬁscal actions presage signiﬁcant future ﬁscal tighten-
ing, in a situation where the current ﬁscal path is unsustainable, this belief
may stimulate current demand while at the same time reducing long-term
interest rates. One can rationalize the magnitude of the observed interest
rate decline and output growth during the early Clinton years by saying
that the tax increase and spending cuts not only changed the levels of
taxes and spending but also had important effects on their expected trajec-
tories; one could explain the timing of the process, which continued after
1993, by saying that the Clinton administration’s commitment to budget
discipline became more credible over time. After all, the budget caps
were extended again, in 1997. But this scenario’s complexity and its
reliance on changes in expectations help illustrate why rigorous empirical
validation is so difﬁcult and why some economists remain skeptical.
Evaluating Policy Proposals
The challenges of predicting the impact of possible ﬁscal policy
changes are evident in the revenue proposals in the president’s budget for
ﬁscal year 2004. These proposals and their estimated revenue effects for
the period 2003–13 are presented in table 8.
Consider the various questions one must address. First, what is the
change in policy? The tax cut appears much larger in ﬁscal years 2011–13,
because the president proposes extending those provisions in the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 that are set to
expire in 2011. But did private agents believe the original tax cut actually
would expire in 2011? This cannot be determined from the CBO projec-
tion, nor does the change in the current year’s revenue or full-employment
116 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
55. For example, Blinder and Yellen (2001, chapter 4, p. 18) point to important dates
when declines in long-term interest rates were associated with milestones in the implemen-
tation of the Clinton program.
56. Auerbach (2002a) reviews some of the recent literature on this subject.
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1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 117surplus provide any information. A similar problem applies to the provi-
sion to temporarily increase the alternative minimum tax exemption
through 2005. As already discussed, the AMT will affect more and more
taxpayers over time, and the reduction in ordinary tax liability under the
2001 legislation will accelerate this. It is reasonable to believe, however,
that the share of taxpayers subject to the AMT would not have been
allowed to rise much above its current level in any case; if so, the tempo-
rary, partial adjustment of the AMT proposed by the president does not
represent a tax cut relative to “current” policy. The same evaluation
applies to the extension of the AMT treatment of nonrefundable personal
credits and the extension of the experimentation credit.
Second, what is the change in incentives? Several of the president’s
proposals are targeted at saving and investment. For these proposals, the
change in current tax payments provides a poor measure of the incentive
effects. One reason is timing. For example, as with the 2002 partial
investment expensing provisions already discussed, the provision to
increase investment expensing for small business has a larger revenue
cost in the short run than in the long run, even though the proposal calls
for a permanent change. The reason is that expensing entails an accelera-
tion of depreciation deductions, so that the current tax reduction for new
investment overstates the present value of the tax beneﬁt. The proposal to
expand tax-free savings accounts is actually expected to produce a rev-
enue gain in the short run, even though it is in effect a substantial tax cut,
because it encourages taxpayers to shift the timing of their tax payments,
withdrawing funds from accounts that have substantial deferred tax liabil-
ities in order to place them in the new accounts, which require smaller (in
present value) tax payments up front. Another reason why tax payments
offer a poor measure of incentive effects stems from the distinction
between tax payments and marginal tax rates. The small business expens-
ing provision would expand covered investment from $25,000 to $75,000
annually; for companies already investing more than $75,000 in a given
year, the provision would have no impact on the marginal tax rate on
investment. The dividend exclusion proposal might have little impact on
the cost of capital for ﬁrms that ﬁnance investment through the retention
of earnings.57
118 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
57. See Auerbach (2002b).
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then, the change in ﬁscal policy under the president’s proposals may bear
little relation to any typical summary measure. Even to estimate the net
effects of these rate reductions, however, one would need good estimates
of the marginal propensities to consume across different tax brackets. One
would also need to apply such a disaggregated model to assess the con-
sumption impact of the proposed dividend tax exclusion, after ﬁrst ﬁgur-
ing out the impact of the exclusion on the stock market and whether
consumers treat assets within pension and sheltered savings plans as if
they were held directly. Only after one has dealt with the problems of
measuring the legislation’s impact on consumption and investment could
the further macroeconomic feedback effects of the proposals be evaluated.
It is instructive to consider the types of models that the CBO actually
used to predict the macroeconomic effects of the president’s proposals. In
all, six models were used: a “textbook” growth model, an inﬁnite-horizon
growth model, a closed-economy life-cycle growth model, an open-
economy life-cycle growth model, and two traditional macroeconomic
forecasting models. Only the life-cycle and inﬁnite-horizon models were
forward looking, and projections for these models were based on alterna-
tive scenarios rather than on formal estimates of expectations. Only the
traditional forecasting models incorporated Keynesian demand-side
effects. In short, the importance of several channels (including expecta-
tions, international ﬂows, demand-side effects, and intergenerational link-
ages) varied sharply across the models, by assumption rather than by
estimation. On the other hand, reﬂecting the complexity of the proposals
being studied, the models typically were speciﬁed at a level of detail that
allowed different tax and expenditure changes to have different types of
effects, in contrast to the simple vector autoregressive models common in
the recent literature on estimating policy effects.
Thus the requirements of dynamic scoring or more general policy eval-
uation go far beyond what estimation alone has provided. A continuing
challenge is to expand the reach of empirical estimation in the derivation
of usable forecasting models, but this is no simple task—economists have
been at this for a long time, and many of the problems laid out above have
no obvious solution. In the meantime, current policy practice addresses
the wide gaps in our knowledge with assumptions and simpliﬁcations that
may be reasonable, but nonetheless may have sizable impacts on the
Alan J. Auerbach 119
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structed make the presentation of formal standard errors difﬁcult, but
future policy evaluations should include some measure of the degree of
uncertainty, lest uninformed readers think that the range of estimates
obtained from different models covers the range of possible outcomes.
Uncharted Waters?
What are the implications of this analysis for the current policy envi-
ronment? It appears that government policy at the federal level responds
to ﬁscal and economic conditions. At the state level, the response to eco-
nomic conditions is weaker and possibly procyclical, and the response to
ﬁscal conditions stronger. But it is very difﬁcult to assess the impact of
policy on the economy, in part because it is difﬁcult to measure what the
relevant policy is for any year or quarter. To measure policy for the pur-
pose of evaluating its impact, one must account for timing, expectations,
and the complex effects that different policy provisions might have,
through a process that is subject to severe empirical limitations. In the
end, economists rely on a variety of assumptions and modeling strategies
that might work well in explaining past behavior. If there has been a
regime shift, our predictions may be poor.
The present ﬁscal and economic situation offers a new combination of
characteristics. Although, in relation to GDP, the projected short-term
annual budget deﬁcits and explicit national debt are well within the his-
torical distribution, the implicit liabilities and associated annual deﬁcits of
the major federal entitlement programs are not. The United States ﬁnds
itself in a period of severe ﬁscal stress, but conventional budget measures
fail to show this. Policy reaction models predict a modest further expan-
sion of the federal deﬁcit, and the president proposes a much larger one,
but no agreed-upon model tells us what effects these changes in policies
might have. State and local governments face unprecedented budget
deﬁcits, which will occasion much larger cuts in their budgets than the
economy has experienced, at least within living memory. How will these
cuts affect the economy? Interest rates, particularly short-term rates, are
today very low. What impact will these low interest rates have on expec-
tations about monetary policy, and how much will they reduce the efﬁ-
cacy of ﬁscal policies that depend on the timing of tax payments, such as
120 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 120investment incentives? Alternative theories allow us to predict a broad
range of possible outcomes, but empirical evidence has done relatively
little to narrow that range. 
APPENDIX A 
Constructing the User Cost of Capital
The basic methodology for constructing the user cost of capital closely
follows that in Auerbach (1983b). I take asset-speciﬁc tax provisions,
including the investment tax credit and depreciation allowances, for each
year from 1953 to 2002 for each of the thirty-four asset classes listed in
table 3 of that paper. To combine these asset-speciﬁc provisions into a
single annual measure, I use capital stock weights for each of the asset
classes, based on capital stocks at the end of the previous year as reported
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Because the BEA’s categories have
expanded since my earlier study, I combine some of the current BEA cat-
egories to obtain capital stock weights for the thirty-four original classes.
One current category, software, has only recently been treated as ﬁxed
investment in the national income and product accounts, so I omit this
category in order to maintain comparability with earlier work.
I assume a relative capital goods price of 1 and a required real rate of
return of 0.04, and I add the rate of change in the GDP deﬂator to this rate
of return to obtain the nominal discount rate applicable to depreciation
deductions. In calculating the change in the user cost from one year to the
next, I hold constant the capital stock weights at the preceding year’s
value. The myopic user cost is based on equation 1 in the text, and the
perfect-foresight user cost on equation 2, summed over the current and
next three years with weights decaying at a geometric rate of 0.5. After
2002, inﬂation rates are assumed to equal the 2002 rate, and the tax law is
assumed not to change, meaning that the partial expensing provisions
enacted in 2002 expire after 2004. Thus the estimated perfect-foresight
cost of capital in 2002 incorporates this announced expiration.
In forming the user cost of capital, I use the statutory corporate tax rate
for the relevant year, making no allowance for complications due to tax
law asymmetries such as the AMT or limits on the deduction of net oper-
ating losses. 
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Calculating the OASDI Closed-Group Liability
This appendix brieﬂy describes the data and methodology used to
derive the implicit OASDI liability estimates reported in table 7. For each
year from 1997 through 2003, annual ﬂows in and out of the OASDI sys-
tem over a roughly seventy-ﬁve-year projection period are taken from that
year’s OASDI trustees’ report. (For the small components needed for
years beyond the projection period, smooth growth of prices and produc-
tivity is assumed.) Projections of the male and female populations at each
age in each of these future years are taken from contemporaneous popula-
tion projections provided by Social Security from unpublished data.58
Projected taxes and beneﬁts in each future year are allocated among
cohorts using the tax and beneﬁt proﬁles by age and sex from Gokhale,
Page, and Sturrock (1999).59 Then, to obtain an estimate of the OASDI
system’s closed-group liability—the amount the system owes to those
already participating—only the taxes and beneﬁts in each future year that
have been allocated by this procedure to individuals who are at least ﬁf-
teen years old in the base year are counted. Finally, all of these included
tax and beneﬁt ﬂows are discounted back to the base year using the long-
term discount factors in that year’s trustees’ report. 
The deﬁcit for each year from 1997 through 2002 equals the next
year’s estimated liability minus that of the current year. The part of this
deﬁcit that is attributable to the change in the base year is obtained by
reestimating the following year’s debt using current-year projections of
ﬂows and population.
122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
58. I am grateful to Seung An and Felicitie Bell at the Social Security Administration
for providing these data.
59. If ai is the relative beneﬁt (or tax) proﬁle element for each cohort i (where i ranges
over age and sex), and pit is cohort i’s population in year t, then the fraction of beneﬁts (or
taxes) in year t allocated to a particular cohort j is ajpjt/(Σiaipit).
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Discussion
William G. Gale: Alan Auerbach’s paper provides a comprehensive
review of issues and signiﬁcant new evidence relating to the conduct of
ﬁscal policy. The paper ﬁnds that standard measures of ﬁscal policy have
been responsive to the state of the economy and the budget outlook in the
past. For a variety of technical reasons, however, it is difﬁcult to pin down
the impact of ﬁscal policy on the economy. It is even more difﬁcult to
determine appropriate ﬁscal policy in the current environment because of
several unusual features of the short-term economic picture and the long-
term budget outlook.
The most intriguing of Auerbach’s results are the regressions that
relate federal and state ﬁscal policy changes to the state of the economy
and the budget. The paper shows that states’ ﬁscal responses, in the aggre-
gate, are sensitive to the lagged aggregate state budget surplus but not to
the business cycle. These results are sensible, given that almost all states
have balanced-budget rules and are unlikely to be able to engage in coun-
tercyclical policy. Given the magnitude of the states’ current budget prob-
lems, the results imply that the states’ responses to those problems could
produce a signiﬁcant drag on the national economy in the near term. On
the other hand, the regressions showing massive responses at the federal
level on a quarterly basis require some explanation. It is difﬁcult to
believe that these equations are picking up true policy responses, given
the lags in information, the delays with which Congress acts, and the
infrequency of major ﬁscal actions. 
The most interesting regressions for federal policy dynamics are in
Auerbach’s tables 2 and 3. The main regressions show that an increase of
1 percent of GDP in a five-year budget deficit projection (with smaller
123
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in the current six-month period that reduce the same weighted deficit
projection by 0.14 percent of GDP, including spending reductions of
0.086 percent of GDP and tax increases of 0.055 percent of GDP. Taken
at face value, these coefficients imply that the average policy response to
an earlier change in policy, or to a shock, that has created a permanent
increase in the deficit eliminates 26 percent of that initial increase in the
first year, 45 percent after two years, 60 percent after three years, and
78 percent after five years. Although judgments may differ, this strikes
me as a fairly rapid response, much more rapid than one might have
guessed given the casual observation that nagging deficits persisted from
the early 1980s to the middle of the 1990s.
The regressions also imply that spending cuts have historically repre-
sented about 60 percent of the policy response. This ﬁnding matters
because how tax cuts are ﬁnanced inﬂuences their effects on economic
growth. Tax cuts ﬁnanced by future spending cuts can raise future
national income, even when the same tax cuts ﬁnanced by future tax
increases have the opposite effect.1
It is hard to know how much weight to put on these regressions, how-
ever, especially for predictive purposes. First, the sample size is small by
necessity. Second, factors omitted from the analysis are likely to affect
ﬁscal policy choices. Budget rules, such as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, are
likely to have inﬂuenced  ﬁscal outcomes, but including them in the
regression is difﬁcult both because of the small sample size and because
the rules themselves are endogenous. Likewise, the source of the change
in the budget outlook may matter; policymakers may respond differently
to exogenous shifts in the outlook than to changes that their own tax and
spending policies created. Ideology also plays a role. President George
W. Bush, for example, proposed a tax cut in 1999, pushed it through as
legislation in 2001, and then proposed that it be accelerated and made per-
manent in 2003, despite the fact that the budget and economic situations
in those three years varied dramatically. 
A third concern is that major tax increases and tax cuts are discrete and
sporadic events. That is, there may be discontinuities between events and
processes that generate no tax change and those that generate small tax
124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
1. See Auerbach (2002c), Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2002b), Elmendorf and Reif-
schneider (2002), and Gale and Potter (2002).
1440-02 BPEA/Auerbach  07/17/03  08:11  Page 124changes. In addition, the factors generating tax increases may be quite dif-
ferent from those generating tax cuts. Yet the paper’s regressions model
tax changes as a continuous and symmetric process. Fourth, the deﬁnition
of policy changes may be suspect. The regressions equate changes in cur-
rent policy with legislated changes in outlays or taxes. In contrast, the dis-
cussion later in the paper on why it is difﬁcult to show how ﬁscal policy
affects the economy emphasizes the difﬁculty of deﬁning current policy
and therefore of identifying the change in policy. How the change in cur-
rent policy is deﬁned in the regressions may have an important impact on
the results. At the very least, however, it should be clear that the regres-
sions use a deﬁnition of current policy whose problems are clearly
explained later in the paper. 
Fifth, the results are somewhat sensitive to relatively minor speciﬁca-
tion changes. Auerbach’s table 3 shows that the results in table 2 are
robust to sample splits based on which party holds the White House, but
may not be robust to splits based on decades, even though the classiﬁca-
tion of data points in the two sample splits is almost the same. His table 4
shows that the response of annual discretionary spending to the budget
situation is unstable over the period, but that is probably because defense
spending responds largely to other factors. Nondefense discretionary
spending responds to the budget outlook in a somewhat more stable man-
ner. Even so, the implied response to a 1-percent-of-GDP increase in the
weighted deﬁcit projection is an offset of 0.13 percent of GDP for non-
defense discretionary spending in 1984–92 and 1993–2002 separately,
but an offset of just 0.03 percent of GDP over the combined period. A
minor quibble is that the discretionary spending equations might have
been improved by looking at changes in budget authority rather than
actual outlays. Authority is what Congress most closely controls; outlays
typically follow authority changes with variable lags, depending on the
type of spending.
For all of these reasons, it is not clear that the regression provides reli-
able predictions for likely policy responses in the future. Besides the
regressions, the paper raises a wide variety of other issues. I will comment
on four of them. 
The ﬁrst is whether it is important to think about long-run issues when
considering short-run ﬁscal stimulus. Some would argue that the long run
is just a series of short runs, implying that there is no distinction between
the two. But the paper is correct to explore the two issues simultaneously,
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do not exist in the short run. The most obvious is that a sustainable budget
can be wildly out of balance in the short run, but it cannot be wildly out of
balance in the long run. In addition, policies that stimulate the economy in
the short run can hurt economic growth in the long run. In the short run, in
an economy operating with excess capacity, increases in aggregate
demand can raise output and income even without increasing the capital
stock. In the long run, economic growth reﬂects expansions in the capac-
ity to produce goods and services. Such expansions, in turn, require
increases in the amounts of labor and capital, improvements in their allo-
cation, or technological advances. As a result, policies that raise con-
sumer spending can raise short-term output in a slack economy, but if
they continue to raise aggregate demand after the economy has reached
full employment, they will reduce future national income by reducing the
saving that can ﬁnance future capital accumulation. Another key link
between the short and the long run is that expectations of future ﬁscal pol-
icy actions help determine the short-run impact of a policy, and those
expectations in turn can depend on the future budget outlook.
A second broad issue is the difﬁculty in determining what constitutes
current policy, as noted above.2 The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce’s base-
line projection is useful—indeed, necessary—because Congress needs a
benchmark against which to measure the costs of proposals that change
the tax law, spending rules, or spending amounts. But the baseline is only
a mechanical projection that is intended to serve as a “neutral benchmark
. . . according to rules [that are] set forth in law and long-standing prac-
tices. . . .”3 It is not intended to be a realistic or substantive projection of
current policy, and indeed it falls short of that in several ways.
The ﬁrst area where the CBO's baseline assumptions do not appear to
be a good reﬂection of current policy involves discretionary spending,
which represents slightly more than a third of total outlays. Discretionary
spending typically requires new appropriations by Congress every year.
That is, current laws generally do not determine what discretionary
spending will be in future years, and this raises the issue of what levels the
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assumes that real discretionary spending will remain constant at the level
prevailing in the ﬁrst year of the ten-year budget period. Because popula-
tion, the price level, and income grow over time, applying this assumption
to the current budget implies that, by 2012, discretionary spending will
have fallen by about 9 percent in real per capita terms and by more than
20 percent relative to GDP. Although judgments may reasonably differ
about future spending choices, the CBO’s assumption is unrealistic both
as a measure that holds current policy constant and as a prediction of
likely spending outcomes. I believe that a more appropriate assumption
would be that real discretionary spending will grow at the same rate as the
population—incidentally the same criterion endorsed by then-Governor
George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential campaign. 
The CBO baseline also makes unrealistic assumptions about expiring
tax provisions. The CBO assumes that Congress will extend expiring
spending programs but that all temporary tax provisions (other than
excise taxes dedicated to trust funds) will expire as scheduled. The
assumption regarding spending is reasonable, since spending programs
with expiration dates are normally renewed. But the assumption regarding
taxes is not reasonable in most cases. The Internal Revenue Code cur-
rently contains several sorts of expiring tax provisions. The ﬁrst includes
the provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act (EGTRRA, the 2001 tax cut). All of these provisions end automati-
cally (sunset) by 2010, and some end sooner than that. The second cate-
gory includes the elements of the 2002 economic stimulus package. The
third involves the provisions of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconcil-
iation Act (JGTRRA, the 2003 tax cut). The fourth is the alternative min-
imum tax (AMT), discussed below. The ﬁfth includes a variety of other
tax provisions that have statutory expiration dates but are routinely
extended for a few years at a time as their expiration date approaches. To
understand the full implications of recent and current ﬁscal policy
choices, the most accurate assumption, on balance, would be that all these
provisions will be extended. This is not a statement of desired or optimal
policy, but simply a conjecture about the current stance of policy.
The AMT offers a dramatic example of how the baseline projections
generate outcomes that are inconsistent with any but the most mechanistic
view of current policy. The AMT was designed in the late 1960s, and then
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of tax avoidance.4 The AMT runs parallel to the regular income tax sys-
tem. It uses a somewhat different measure of income, permits fewer
deductions, and applies a ﬂatter schedule of marginal tax rates than does
the regular income tax. In theory, all taxpayers must compute their tax lia-
bility under both the conventional income tax and the AMT and pay the
greater of the two. In practice, the AMT currently generates a larger lia-
bility for so few taxpayers—about 3 million—that few ﬁlers, other than
the tiny minority who might be affected, bother with it. But because the
AMT is not adjusted for inﬂation, whereas the ordinary income tax is, the
AMT applies to ever more taxpayers as prices rise. In addition, EGTRRA,
which cut the ordinary income tax but not the AMT, will greatly increase
the number of people subject to the AMT. All told, by 2010 an estimated
33 million ﬁlers will have become subject to the AMT under current law.
This result is troubling in large part because the AMT is signiﬁcantly
more complex than the regular tax. Policymakers will therefore be under
powerful pressure to modify it. Although specifying current policy
toward the AMT is difﬁcult, I assume for illustrative purposes that provi-
sions of the AMT that are slated to expire before the end of the budget
window are granted a continuance and that the AMT becomes indexed for
inﬂation and allows dependent exemptions, which it currently does not.
These adjustments for alternative measures of current policy are
important because they are huge. Over the ten-year budget horizon, they
would reduce revenue by almost $2.2 trillion; counting interest payments,
they would reduce the ten-year undiscounted sum of budget surpluses by
more than $2.5 trillion. Perhaps a clearer way of portraying the long-term
magnitude is to note that, by 2013, extending the expiring provisions in
current law and ﬁxing the AMT as I have assumed would reduce revenue
on a permanent basis by 3.0 percent of GDP.5
A third broad issue raised in the paper is how our current ﬁscal prob-
lems and tax choices compare with those in the past. The good news is
that, under the current ten-year budget outlook, projected deﬁcits and debt
held by the public, as percentages of GDP, would be well within the range
experienced during the past forty years. The bad news is that these com-
parisons are not particularly relevant or informative, for several reasons
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cial debt and deﬁcit ﬁgures ignore the looming problems in Social Secu-
rity and Medicare. The liabilities of these programs represent a form of
implicit federal debt. Even the administration in its ﬁscal year 2004 bud-
get proposal points out that current “long-run budget projections show
clearly that the budget is on an unsustainable path.”6
Comparisons with the 1981 tax cut are particularly germane. Against
a comparable baseline, the administration’s proposed tax cuts would
roughly equal the net size of the Reagan tax cuts as a share of the econ-
omy. But the situation today is far different from what it was in the early
1980s. The nation was much better prepared in the 1980s and early 1990s
to deal with the ﬁscal deﬁcits stemming from large tax cuts than it is now.
National saving was signiﬁcantly higher in the early 1980s than in recent
years. The United States was an international creditor in the early 1980s
but is a substantial debtor today. And in the early 1980s the retirement of
the baby-boom generation was still more than twenty-ﬁve years away,
giving the nation time to recover before facing the intense ﬁscal pressures
of that demographic tidal wave. The economic beneﬁts of cuts in marginal
tax rates were also higher in 1980, because marginal tax rates were signif-
icantly higher then. 
In addition, the adverse ﬁscal effects of the 1980s tax cuts were attenu-
ated by several policy responses and fortuitous, exogenous events that
soon followed but seem unlikely to be repeated. The policy responses
include the raising of taxes in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1990, and 1993 and the
institution of budget rules that helped keep spending constant or declining
as a share of GDP. The fortuitous events include the breakup of the Soviet
Union in the 1980s, which generated a substantial peace dividend: of the
2.5-percentage-point decline in noninterest spending as a share of GDP
from 1990 to 2000, 2.2 percentage points came from defense. In the 1990s
a surge in productivity helped boost revenue.
Today, in contrast, defense spending is slated to rise. Mandatory enti-
tlement spending is also expected to rise markedly: unlike in the 1980s,
the retirement of the baby-boomers is now imminent. Rather than
attempting to close the budget shortfall, the administration is pursuing
still more tax cuts. Under the administration’s budget proposals, projected
federal revenue in 2004 would fall to 16.9 percent of GDP, its lowest
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zero, the savings would not come close to offsetting the increases in
mandatory and defense spending and the proposed reduction in taxes. As
a result, along many dimensions, the ﬁscal situation is much more trou-
bling now than it was in the early 1980s.
The fourth issue raised by the paper is identifying “the real ﬁscal dan-
ger.” It is now well understood that Social Security and Medicare face
substantial long-term shortfalls. As noted, extending all of the administra-
tion’s tax cuts, the other expiring provisions, and ﬁxing the AMT would
reduce long-term revenue by 3.0 percent of GDP over the next seventy-
ﬁve years. That is more than three times the actuarial deﬁcit in Social
Security, and signiﬁcantly larger than the combined actuarial deﬁcits in
Social Security and Medicare’s Hospital Insurance program over the
same period. Examining only the value of the future cash ﬂows does not
change the fundamental conclusions. Even with a horizon that extends
beyond seventy-ﬁve years to examine permanent changes, the cost of the
tax cuts still exceeds the Social Security shortfall. By these measures, the
administration’s tax-cutting agenda deserves at least equal billing with
the entitlement shortfalls on the list of policies accounting for “the real
ﬁscal danger.”
Auerbach’s paper is constructive in bringing a wide variety of interest-
ing evidence and perspective to bear on all of these issues. The paper rep-
resents an important contribution to our understanding of what we know
about ﬁscal policy—and what we still have to learn. 
William D. Nordhaus: Alan Auerbach has written a useful paper review-
ing the ﬁscal troops as the United States emerges from war with Iraq and
continues its war on terrorism. There is much in the paper to compliment
and little to complain about. Especially interesting are the estimates of ﬁs-
cal reactions of federal and lower-level governments to economic condi-
tions. But in the venerable tradition of discussants I will concentrate on
complaints—primarily about the core of the paper, which discusses the
history of ﬁscal policy over the last two decades.
The major contribution of Auerbach’s paper is its review of the rela-
tionship between the federal budget and the economy, concentrating on
the effects of the economy on policy. He correctly notes that changes in
the budget can have sources other than policy changes. The Congres-
sional Budget Ofﬁce breaks down changes in the budget into legislative,
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side. Only the legislative sources of ﬁscal changes are under the direct
control of ﬁscal policymakers, but Auerbach notes that nonlegislative
changes often give rise to quite large changes in the budget. For example,
in the January 2003 CBO projection, the ten-year budget moved toward
deﬁcit by $385 billion, but only $64 billion of that was due to legislative
decisions. Most of the revisions were “technical.” Indeed, technical revi-
sions, at $388 billion, more than accounted for the total change; $140 bil-
lion came from revisions to revenue projections. Auerbach therefore turns
to a new and very revealing way of gauging changes in policy, focusing
only on the legislative changes in the budget between consecutive CBO
reports. To do this, he collates CBO estimates of the changes in revenue
and expenditure from each of the biannual reports starting in 1981.
CBO scorekeeping raises certain issues. Many supply-side and other
proto-economists argue that the CBO should engage in “dynamic scor-
ing” to take into account the higher investment and growth in hours
worked that come from lowering marginal tax rates. In March of this year
the CBO issued a ﬁrst report on dynamic scoring, which found that
dynamic scoring made only a small difference to the budget projections
and, more interesting, that four of the seven models it tested showed
larger rather than smaller deﬁcits under dynamic scoring. 
Others argue that the CBO’s expenditure assumptions are generally
biased downward, particularly in the health care area. The CBO’s scoring
methodology results in frequent upward “technical” corrections in spend-
ing on health or foreseeable “legislative” extensions of temporary tax pro-
visions. But the CBO numbers have the great virtue of being put together
by people who know how to count on more than one hand and with a set
of rules that has changed little over the last two decades. I applaud Auer-
bach’s introduction of these numbers into the analysis.
Having introduced the data, however, Auerbach then posts with exces-
sive speed to the econometric analysis. I would have preferred a pause to
look at the data more closely. So, relying on the kindness of authors, I
obtained the raw CBO data from Auerbach and did the scrutinizing
myself. 
There appear to have been three distinct regimes for expenditure over
the last two decades. The ﬁrst is from the early 1980s until 1992. During
this period the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio was high, perceived to be high, and
felt to be a major concern by both administrations and Congresses. There
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sporadic: the CBO reports identify them as occurring in early 1986, 1988,
1990, and 1991. (Recall that budget caps and the “pay as you go” rules,
which required that any additional spending or tax cuts be offset by tax
increases or spending reductions elsewhere, were in effect from 1990
until they expired in September 2002.) From 1993 until 1997, by contrast,
the budget was on a favorable trajectory, the budget caps were effective,
and there were essentially no legislative changes in expenditure. 
The ﬁnal period occurred when the budget deﬁcit moved toward sur-
plus in 1998, at which point discipline over expenditure collapsed: every
CBO report since the summer of 1998 has recorded legislative increases
in expenditure. The time series is relatively short, but the two striking fea-
tures of the expenditure history are that budget caps appear to have been
effective on the expenditure side during the early 1990s and that, with or
without budget caps, Congress abhors a surplus.
As an aside, it is worth noting that Congress appears to behave much
like the private sector in its accounting. Auerbach’s table 7 shows how
ﬂawed the standard ﬁscal accounting is as a measure of change in net
ﬁnancial obligations. According to Auerbach’s numbers, the standard
measure of the OASDI budget was off by $878 billion in 2000. Yet the
budget process does not appear to care, or for that matter even to know,
about these numbers. Behavioral economics is clearly at work here: the
budget system looks only at the bottom line of the measured surplus or
deﬁcit and ignores lockboxes and generational accounting, much as the
stock market ignores the footnotes in corporate ﬁnancial statements.
On the revenue side, the striking fact about the legislative changes is
how infrequent they are and how little they seem to be explainable by
economic conditions. The two major tax cuts of the last roughly forty
years, in 1981 and 2001, occurred under diametrically opposite budgetary
conditions and quite different economic conditions: with the budget in
deﬁcit in the ﬁrst case, and in surplus in the second; and with an economy
mired in stagﬂation in the ﬁrst case, and growing robustly in the second.
In contrast, the four tax increases that came between these two large tax
cuts are plausibly related to the large (measured) ﬁscal deﬁcits of the
time. I suspect that a careful reckoning would indeed show that all the
major tax increases of the last century (excepting increases in social insur-
ance taxes) were triggered by deﬁcits or, in wartime, the prospect of
deﬁcits. This history also shows that any politicometric treatment of taxes
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come every day of the year, whereas the IRS auditor is treated like ants at
a picnic.
One of my worries about the paper is that the results do not appear
robust to speciﬁcation changes. Looking at tables 2 and 3, we see that
coefﬁcients differ by factors of four among different speciﬁcations. I tried
some additional speciﬁcations using Auerbach’s data and found even
larger differences, depending upon the sample period and timing. Adding
the Reagan tax cuts of 1981 made a big difference in the equations I esti-
mated, and even changed the signs in some instances. I am not terribly
surprised that Auerbach’s results are not robust, particularly for revenue.
Work on the political business cycle has shown that the determinants of
ﬁscal policy vary greatly across time and across countries. Faced with a
stagnant economy, President Kennedy proposed tax cuts, whereas Presi-
dent Clinton in the same circumstances proposed deﬁcit reduction. Faced
with a reelection campaign, President Nixon imposed wage and price con-
trols, whereas President Carter decontrolled. Faced with surging budget
deﬁcits and escalating military spending in a ﬁrst term, President Reagan
worked to curb the deﬁcit, whereas the current President Bush is moving
to widen it. It is hard to ﬁnd any pattern of behavior here, and I suspect
this is why ﬁscal equations are so fragile.
Finally, there is an interesting and depressing lesson here for responsi-
ble political leaders who choose to run a budgetary surplus. In March
2000, then-Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers eloquently pro-
vided the rationale for running a budget surplus:
By continuing to pay down debt within a framework that helps us meet our
future commitments to Social Security and Medicare, we can help to maintain
the virtuous cycle we have worked so hard to achieve. And we can re-load the
ﬁscal cannon, preparing the government to respond to future contingencies
such as recessions or threats from overseas.1
One has to wonder whether Summers’ policy advice—and President Clin-
ton’s acceptance of it—would have been different had they known that
their hard-earned surpluses would soon be spent on abolishing the inheri-
tance tax, repealing the tax on dividends, reducing the top income tax
rates, and shooting off the remaining rounds of the ﬁscal cannon in the
deserts of Iraq. I suspect that, had they foreseen these events, they would
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hardly be lost on future administrations: I would guess that the next
Democratic administration will be quick to use any ﬁscal resources left to
it for what it believes to be major current priorities, rather than save them
for some future administration to fritter away.
General discussion: Eric Leeper questioned the usefulness of the concept
of unfunded liabilities. The term suggests that the current situation does
not represent an equilibrium, and it raises puzzling questions about why
long-term interest rates today are not higher than they are. But one can
think of this situation as an equilibrium in the sense that individuals mak-
ing decisions today form expectations about likely future policy actions to
fund these liabilities. These actions lie on a continuum, and one can ask
what set of unobserved beliefs about future policies might be consistent
with the budget situation we observe today. Rather than remain puzzled
about why long-term interest rates have not risen as we think they should
have, given the unfunded liabilities, one could use this approach to indi-
cate that the public expects future policy adjustments, and so correctly
perceives these liabilities as funded in the long run. Auerbach granted
that, as Leeper suggested, ﬁnancial markets might be responding with
conﬁdence that the unfunded liabilities will be ﬁnanced. Or they may sim-
ply not understand the true situation. As a parallel, he noted that corpora-
tions that do not want to value options more transparently are ﬁghting
with reformers and investors who want them to. Since the information
about options already exists, the fact that this ﬁght goes on suggests that
agents would respond differently if the information were presented more
clearly. 
George Perry also questioned the usefulness of the unfunded liabilities
concept. The paper suggests that the incorporation of unfunded liabilities
into ofﬁcial budget projections would both help bestir policymakers and
meaningfully inform the decisions of private agents. On the ﬁrst point,
although it would be desirable to address the future of entitlements pro-
grams sooner rather than later, Perry reasoned that the failure to do so
reﬂected politicians’ unwillingness to make unpopular changes rather
than a misunderstanding about the size of the problem. On the second, he
suspected that changes in the reporting of unfunded liabilities would have
a negligible effect on the current behavior of private agents, in part
because when and how politicians would respond is unknown, and in part
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distant horizons. He concluded that including unfunded liabilities in the
presentation of current ﬁscal policy is likely to confuse rather than clarify
how ﬁscal policy affects the economy. 
Thomas Sargent suggested that the views of ﬁscal policy expressed by
Leeper and Perry could be thought of as polar versions of possible equi-
librium situations. If perfect commitment of the ﬁscal authority were pos-
sible, one could compute Ramsey policies—a sequence of efﬁcient
actions. By construction, such policies are feasible and the debt paths
associated with them are sustainable. The analysis forces the government
to think about the future when designing its policies. The resulting poli-
cies are credible because the government is assumed to abide by a com-
mitment technology. Another possibility is that governments do not
worry about the future, except to predict the actions of their successors.
Each administration does the best it can given its predictions about future
behavior. The policy outcomes of this kind of equilibrium are often
improvable. Sargent noted that Marco Bassetto has recently analyzed
these two polar cases and clariﬁed their implications for the ﬁscal theory
of the price level. Sargent also cited a half-serious proposal by Alan
Blinder to establish an independent ﬁscal authority, as a way to overcome
time inconsistency problems in the same way that independent central
banks are thought to do. 
Remarking on the present economic situation, Benjamin Friedman
emphasized that the recent recession had been very mild, with unemploy-
ment rates staying at or below 6 percent, and GDP growing except in
three quarters during 2001. Thus, although the recovery seems to be a job-
less one, like that of 1992-93, the episode still ranks as only a mild down-
turn. Hence it is not surprising that the automatic ﬁscal stabilizers have
not changed the budget by much, and, compared with many much more
severe downturns in the past, the need for discretionary ﬁscal stimulus is
not pressing. Friedman also remarked that since the data on state and local
budgets go back only to the late 1970s, it is unclear to what extent recent
budgetary changes in the state-local sector have been unusual, given the
mildness of the downturn, and to what extent they simply continue a long
trend toward more borrowing by states and localities. 
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